(Self-) Enforcement of Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism Contracts
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More about this item
KeywordsJoint Implementation; Clean Development Mechanism; climate protection; international environmental agreements; international investments; contract enforcement; co-operation; incentive compatibility;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-06-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-1999-06-08 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-1999-06-08 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-1999-06-08 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1999-06-08 (Microeconomics)
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