The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition
This paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short-term climate change policy package guided by the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Berlin Mandate initiatives. Game theoretic tools and the global trade-environment interface are explored within a 26-region, 13- commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of OECD regions to comply with a non-binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition. The results have shown that the achievement of such a coalition as well as its expansion by means of self-financed schemes are possible if suitable trade instruments are designed.
|Date of creation:||26 Jul 1998|
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