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The CO2 Abatement Game: Costs, Incentives and the Stability of a Sub-Global Coalition

  • Mustafa Babiker

    (University of Colorado at Boulder)

Registered author(s):

    This paper studies the economic incentives and the institutional issues governing the outcomes of a short-term climate change policy package guided by the United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Berlin Mandate initiatives. Game theoretic tools and the global trade-environment interface are explored within a 26-region, 13- commodity computable general equilibrium framework to characterize the incentives of OECD regions to comply with a non-binding agreement in a carbon abatement coalition. The results have shown that the achievement of such a coalition as well as its expansion by means of self-financed schemes are possible if suitable trade instruments are designed.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/comp/papers/9807/9807002.pdf
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    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Computational Economics with number 9807002.

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    Length: 55 pages
    Date of creation: 26 Jul 1998
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpco:9807002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX/UNIX Sparc TeX; to print on HP/PostScript/Franciscan monk; pages: 55 ; figures: included. This work has one the Society of Computational Economics' contest for graduate student paper 1998
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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    11. Rutherford, Thomas F, 1999. "Applied General Equilibrium Modeling with MPSGE as a GAMS Subsystem: An Overview of the Modeling Framework and Syntax," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 14(1-2), pages 1-46, October.
    12. Khalid Nainar, S. M., 1989. "Bootstrapping for consistent standard errors for translog price elasticities : Some evidence from industrial electricity demand," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 319-322, October.
    13. Todd Sandler & Keith Sargent, 1995. "Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness, and Treaty Formation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 71(2), pages 145-162.
    14. John Whalley & Randall Wigle, 1991. "Cutting CO2 Emissions: The Effects of Alternative Policy Approaches," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 109-124.
    15. William D. Nordhaus, 1993. "Reflections on the Economics of Climate Change," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 11-25, Fall.
    16. Whalley, John, 1991. "The Interface between Environmental and Trade Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(405), pages 180-89, March.
    17. Schelling, Thomas C, 1992. "Some Economics of Global Warming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 1-14, March.
    18. Piggott, John & Whalley, John & Wigle, Randall, 1993. "How large are the incentives to join subglobal carbon-reduction initiatives?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 15(5-6), pages 473-490.
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