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Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem

Author

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  • Elie Appelbaum

    (Department of Economics, York University)

  • Eliakim Katz

Abstract

This paper provides an explanation for the emergence of political extremism in an environment in which a change in “ré gime” requires an investment that benefits more than one player. We show that in order to mitigate the effects of free riding, players may choose extreme positions. Further, we show that as the free rider problem becomes more severe, both parties move to more extreme positions in the same direction.

Suggested Citation

  • Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2005. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Working Papers 2005_3, York University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:yca:wpaper:2005_3
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2021. "Overzealous Rule Makers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 341-365.
    2. Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
    3. Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 160-176, June.
    4. Elie Appelbaum, 2008. "Extremism: Root Causes and Strategic Use in Conflicts," Working Papers 2008_02, York University, Department of Economics.
    5. Appelbaum, Elie, 2022. "The dynamic interactions of hate, violence and economic well-being," MPRA Paper 121653, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Appelbaum, Elie, 2008. "Extremism as a strategic tool in conflicts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 352-364, November.
    7. Elie Appelbaum, 2013. "The Dynamics of Hate and Violence," Working Papers 2013_01, York University, Department of Economics.
    8. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2003. "Firm Location Choice in the Presence of a Free Rider Problem," Working Papers 2003_6, York University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political extremism; Free rider; Régime change; Sequential game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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