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Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why

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  • Michael Waldman

    (UCLA)

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  • Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:456
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. B. Curtis Eaton & Roger Ware, 1987. "A Theory of Market Structure with Sequential Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, Spring.
    3. Ware, Roger, 1984. "Sunk Costs and Strategic Commitment: A Proposed Three-Stage Equilibrium," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 370-378, June.
    4. McLean, Richard P. & Riordan, Michael H., 1989. "Industry structure with sequential technology choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-21, February.
    5. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
    7. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 301-310.
    8. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1149-1172, September.
    9. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "Strategic Entry Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 335-338, May.
    10. Spulber, Daniel F, 1981. "Capacity, Output, and Sequential Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 503-514, June.
    11. Edward C. Prescott & Michael Visscher, 1977. "Sequential Location among Firms with Foresight," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 378-393, Autumn.
    12. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    13. B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
    14. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
    15. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
    16. Bulow, Jeremy & Geanakoplos, John & Klemperer, Paul, 1985. "Holding Idle Capacity to Deter Entry [The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence]," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(377), pages 178-182, March.
    17. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1984. "Strategic Deterrence of Sequential Entry into an Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 1-11, Spring.
    18. Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson (ed.), 1986. "New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262690934, April.
    19. Richard Gilbert & Xavier Vives, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83.
    20. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1987. "Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 211-231, Summer.
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