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La crédibilité de la banque centrale face aux défis de la monnaie électronique

  • Gilbert Bougi


    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Helmi Hamdi

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

Depuis quelques années, nous assistons à une double évolution du comportement stratégique de la banque centrale : à l’impératif de la crédibilité s’ajoute la nécessité d’innovation. L’incertitude est inhérente à l’innovation technologique dans le domaine monétaire, s’agissant particulièrement de l’émergence de la monnaie électronique. Notre contribution cherche à analyser les effets de l’incertitude sur la politique monétaire de la banque centrale. La monnaie électronique n’est pas neutre sur la quantification de la monnaie. Elle peut déplacer la frontière entre les actifs liquides (proches substituts de la monnaie) et ceux qui le sont moins. La prise en compte de l’incertitude va-t-elle affecter la crédibilité de la banque centrale ?

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Paper provided by Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM in its series CAE Working Papers with number 56.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:56
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