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La crédibilité de la banque centrale face aux défis de la monnaie électronique

Author

Listed:
  • Gilbert Bougi

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

  • Helmi Hamdi

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

Abstract

Depuis quelques années, nous assistons à une double évolution du comportement stratégique de la banque centrale : à l’impératif de la crédibilité s’ajoute la nécessité d’innovation. L’incertitude est inhérente à l’innovation technologique dans le domaine monétaire, s’agissant particulièrement de l’émergence de la monnaie électronique. Notre contribution cherche à analyser les effets de l’incertitude sur la politique monétaire de la banque centrale. La monnaie électronique n’est pas neutre sur la quantification de la monnaie. Elle peut déplacer la frontière entre les actifs liquides (proches substituts de la monnaie) et ceux qui le sont moins. La prise en compte de l’incertitude va-t-elle affecter la crédibilité de la banque centrale ?

Suggested Citation

  • Gilbert Bougi & Helmi Hamdi, 2007. "La crédibilité de la banque centrale face aux défis de la monnaie électronique," CAE Working Papers 56, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:56
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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