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An Institutional Framework for Comparing Emerging Market Currency Boards

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  • Mrs. Marie T Dal Corso

Abstract

This paper offers an in-depth review of the institutional arrangements underlying existing currency boards (CBAs) in Argentina (until 2001), Eastern Europe, and Asia. An index of precommitment is derived from an analysis of legislative frameworks and monetary policy operations. The index covers features associated with monetary and exchange rate credibility such as: (i) clarity of legal basis, (ii) quality of reserve coverage, (iii) coverage of monetary aggregates, (iv) claims on reserves, (v) operational autonomy, (vi) transparency and accountability, and (vii) escape clauses. The paper concludes with a discussion of flexibility and credibility trade-offs and exit issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Mrs. Marie T Dal Corso, 2004. "An Institutional Framework for Comparing Emerging Market Currency Boards," IMF Working Papers 2004/180, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2004/180
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    Cited by:

    1. Mr. Pablo F Druck & Mr. Mario Dehesa, 2008. "The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank: Challenges to an Effective Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 2008/214, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Nikolai Nenovski, 2006. "Monetary Convergence En-route to Euro-Zone: Theoretical Problems," Godishnik na UNSS, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 171-197, May.
    3. Holger Wolf, 2016. "Currency boards as a path towards the Eurozone: lessons from the Baltics," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, January.
    4. Nikolai Nenovski, 2006. "Monetary Convergence En-route to Euro-Zone: Theoretical Problems," Nauchni trudove, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 171-197, May.

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