Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?
Visiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.
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