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Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?

  • Xavier Debrun

Visiting Bruegel Scholar, Xavier Debrun, discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline.

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Paper provided by Bruegel in its series Working Papers with number 48.

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Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:48
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  1. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
  2. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
  3. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second best world," Other publications TiSEM 9cf95e79-e382-4268-8e4d-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  4. Jordi Gali & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," NBER Working Papers 9773, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Richard Morris & Hedwig Ongena & Ludger Schuknecht, 2006. "The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Occasional Paper Series 47, European Central Bank.
  7. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 575, Boston College Department of Economics.
  8. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May.
  9. francesca castellani, 2002. "A Model of Central Bank's Accountability," IHEID Working Papers 04-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  10. Anthony M Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact; How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/116, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Beetsma, Roel M.W.J. & Debrun, Xavier, 2007. "The new stability and growth pact: A first assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 453-477, February.
  12. Paolo Manasse, 2005. "Deficit Limits, Budget Rules, and Fiscal Policy," IMF Working Papers 05/120, International Monetary Fund.
  13. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-59, November.
  14. Paul R Masson & Xavier Debrun & Catherine A Pattillo, 2002. "Monetary Union in West Africa; Who Might Gain, Who Might Lose, and Why?," IMF Working Papers 02/226, International Monetary Fund.
  15. Oya Celasun & Joong S Kang, 2006. "On the Properties of Various Estimators for Fiscal Reaction Functions," IMF Working Papers 06/182, International Monetary Fund.
  16. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006. "A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction," CEPR Discussion Papers 5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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