IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The impact of national fiscal rules on the stabilisation function of fiscal policy

  • Sacchi, Agnese
  • Salotti, Simone

We study the relationship between discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability in 21 OECD countries over the 1985-2012 period. The novelties of our contribution lie in the use of annual panel data, whereas most of the existing evidence is cross-sectional, and more importantly in the thorough investigation of how fiscal rules affect the policy-macroeconomic stability relationship. We find that the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal policy, particularly of government consumption items, leads to higher volatility of both output and inflation. However, when strict fiscal rules are introduced, discretionary policy becomes output-stabilising rather than destabilising. This result can be more easily achieved by rules on balanced budgets, rather than on expenditures, revenues, or debt. On the other hand, fiscal rules are unable to affect the inflation-destabilising nature of discretionary policy, probably because of the higher importance of central banks in that respect.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56982/1/MPRA_paper_56982.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 56982.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56982
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2009. "Political institutions and economic volatility," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 311-326, September.
  2. Jonathan Rodden & Erik Wibbels, 2010. "Fiscal Decentralization And The Business Cycle: An Empirical Study Of Seven Federations," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 37-67, 03.
  3. Davide Furceri & Marcos Poplawski Ribeiro, 2009. "Government Consumption Volatility and the Size of Nations," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 687, OECD Publishing.
  4. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output," NBER Working Papers 7269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Xavier Debrun & Laurent Moulin & Alessandro Turrini & Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2008. "Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 297-362, 04.
  6. Signe Krogstrup & Sébastien Wälti, 2007. "Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes?," Trinity Economics Papers tep0607, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
  7. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Heinrich Ursprung, 2006. "The Impact of Globalization on the Composition of Government Expenditures: Evidence from Panel Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 1755, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. António Afonso & Luca Agnello & Davide Furceri, 2008. "Fiscal Policy Responiveness, Persistence and Discretion," Working Papers Department of Economics 2008/50, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  9. Roland Vaubel, 2009. "Constitutional courts as promoters of political centralization: lessons for the European Court of Justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 203-222, December.
  10. John C. Driscoll & Aart C. Kraay, 1998. "Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation With Spatially Dependent Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 549-560, November.
  11. International Monetary Fund, 1996. "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline," IMF Working Papers 96/78, International Monetary Fund.
  12. M. Hashem Pesaran, 2004. "General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels," CESifo Working Paper Series 1229, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. von-Hagen, Jurgen, 2006. "Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the European Union and Japan," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 24(1), pages 25-60, March.
  14. Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
  16. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October.
  17. Gali, Jordi, 1994. "Government size and macroeconomic stability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 117-132, January.
  18. Anna Iara & Guntram B. Wolff, 2011. "Rules and risk in the euro area," Working Papers 615, Bruegel.
  19. Hallerberg, Mark & Strauch, Rolf & Hagen, Jürgen von, 2006. "The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 150, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  20. Robert W.R. Price, 2010. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 776, OECD Publishing.
  21. Nicole Madariaga & Sandra Poncet, 2006. "FDI in Chinese Cities: Spillovers and Impact on Growth," Working Papers 2006-22, CEPII research center.
  22. Stéphanie Guichard & Mike Kennedy & Eckhard Wurzel & Christophe André, 2007. "What Promotes Fiscal Consolidation: OECD Country Experiences," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 553, OECD Publishing.
  23. Herrera, Santiago & Vincent, Bruno, 2008. "Public expenditure and consumption volatility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4633, The World Bank.
  24. R Blundell & Steven Bond, . "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data model," Economics Papers W14&104., Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  25. António Afonso & Davide Furceri, 2008. "Government Size, Composition, Volatility and Economic Growth," Working Papers Department of Economics 2008/04, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
  26. Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005. "Sub-central government fiscal rules," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(2), pages 141-181.
  27. Norman V. Loayza & Romain Rancière & Luis Servén & Jaume Ventura, 2007. "Macroeconomic Volatility and Welfare in Developing Countries: An Introduction," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 21(3), pages 343-357, October.
  28. Allen Schick, 2010. "Post-Crisis Fiscal Rules: Stabilising Public Finance while Responding to Economic Aftershocks," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18.
  29. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1995. "Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 32-48, March.
  30. Stilianos Fountas & Menelaos Karanasos & Jinki Kim, 2006. "Inflation Uncertainty, Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeconomic Performance," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 68(3), pages 319-343, 06.
  31. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
  32. Bond, Stephen Roy & Hoeffler, Anke & Temple, Jonathan, 2001. "GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 3048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  33. Ozer-Balli, Hatice & Sørensen, Bent E, 2010. "Interaction Effects in Econometrics," CEPR Discussion Papers 7929, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  34. Fatas, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2006. "The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the US states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 101-117, January.
  35. Mork, Knut Anton, 1989. "Oil and Macroeconomy When Prices Go Up and Down: An Extension of Hamilton's Results," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 740-44, June.
  36. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," NBER Working Papers 5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Joan Paredes & Diego J. Pedregal & Javier J. Pérez, 2009. "A quarterly fiscal database for the euro area based on intra-annual fiscal information," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 0935, Banco de Espa�a.
  38. Charles Wyplosz, 2011. "Fiscal Discipline: Rules Rather than Institutions," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 217(1), pages R19-R30, July.
  39. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case For Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447, November.
  40. Alan S. Blinder, 2004. "The Case Against the Case Against Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Working Papers 102, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
  41. Elke Baumann & Elmar Dönnebrink & Christian Kastrop, 2008. "A Concept for a New Budget Rule for Germany," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(2), pages 37-45, 07.
  42. Alberto Alesina & Tamim Bayoumi, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  43. Davide Furceri, 2007. "Is Government Expenditure Volatility Harmful for Growth? A Cross-Country Analysis," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 28(1), pages 103-120, 03.
  44. Lee, Kiseok & Ni, Shawn, 2002. "On the dynamic effects of oil price shocks: a study using industry level data," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 823-852, May.
  45. Fatas, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2001. "Government size and automatic stabilizers: international and intranational evidence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 3-28, October.
  46. Galí, Jordi & Perotti, Roberto, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 3933, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  47. Svensson, Lars O, 2005. "Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting," MPRA Paper 819, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  48. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions; Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund.
  49. Andrea Schaechter & Carlo Cottarelli, 2010. "Long-Term Trends in Public Finances in the G-7 Economies," IMF Staff Position Notes 2010/13, International Monetary Fund.
  50. Jaroslaw Kantorowicz, 2014. "Judges as Fiscal Activists: Can Constitutional Review Shape Public Finance?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 79-104, June.
  51. Michael Dotsey & Max Reid, 1992. "Oil shocks, monetary policy, and economic activity," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jul, pages 14-27.
  52. Rother, Philipp, 2004. "Fiscal policy and inflation volatility," Working Paper Series 0317, European Central Bank.
  53. Neyapti, Bilin, 2010. "Fiscal decentralization and deficits: International evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 155-166, June.
  54. Nina Budina & Tidiane Kinda & Andrea Schaechter & Anke Weber, 2012. "Fiscal Rules at a Glance; Country Details from a New Dataset," IMF Working Papers 12/273, International Monetary Fund.
  55. Hagen, Jürgen von, 2006. "Fiscal Rules and Fiscal Performance in the EU and Japan," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 147, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  56. Lavigne, Robert, 2011. "The political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustment: Entering and exiting fiscal distress," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 17-35, March.
  57. Paolo Manasse, 2007. "Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 54(3), pages 455-473, July.
  58. Foremny, Dirk, 2014. "Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 86-110.
  59. Alexander Plekhanov & Manmohan S. Kumar & Daniel Leigh, 2007. "Fiscal Adjustments; Determinants and Macroeconomic Consequences," IMF Working Papers 07/178, International Monetary Fund.
  60. Gösta Ljungman, 2008. "Expenditure Ceilings: A Survey," IMF Working Papers 08/282, International Monetary Fund.
  61. H. Badinger, 2009. "Fiscal rules, discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability: an empirical assessment for OECD countries," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(7), pages 829-847.
  62. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
  63. Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Sanchez Fuentes, Jesus & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2010. "Towards expenditure rules and fiscal sanity in the euro area," Working Paper Series 1266, European Central Bank.
  64. Ian Lienert, 2010. "Should Advanced Countries Adopt a Fiscal Responsibility Law?," IMF Working Papers 10/254, International Monetary Fund.
  65. Charles Wyplosz, 2006. "European Monetary Union: the dark sides of a major success," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 21(46), pages 207-261, 04.
  66. Blume, Lorenz & Voigt, Stefan, 2013. "The economic effects of constitutional budget institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 236-251.
  67. Axel Dreher, 2006. "Does globalization affect growth? Evidence from a new index of globalization," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(10), pages 1091-1110.
  68. Nina Budina & Andrea Schaechter & Anke Weber & Tidiane Kinda, 2012. "Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis; Toward the "Next-Generation" Rules: A New Dataset," IMF Working Papers 12/187, International Monetary Fund.
  69. Jean-Louis Combes & Xavier Debrun & Alexandru Minea & Rene Tapsoba, 2014. "Inflation Targeting and Fiscal Rules: Do Interactions and Sequencing Matter?," IMF Working Papers 14/89, International Monetary Fund.
  70. Arellano, Manuel & Bond, Stephen, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 277-97, April.
  71. Stephen Bond & Anke Hoeffler, 2001. "GMM Estimation of Empirical Growth Models," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-W21, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  72. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56982. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.