IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

L’endettement public des provinces canadiennes : Les règles d’équilibre budgétaire sont-elles efficaces?

Listed author(s):
  • Étienne Farvaque
  • Martial Foucault
  • Marcelin Joanis

Ce rapport fait le point sur la question des règles budgétaires, qui occupe une place centrale dans les débats de politiques publiques sur la résorption éventuelle des déficits hérités de la Grande Récession. Dans une première partie, nous exposons les grands débats théoriques relatifs aux règles budgétaires. Dans une seconde partie, nous définissons une nomenclature des règles budgétaires en vigueur dans les provinces canadiennes. La nomenclature proposée est plus fine que celle existant dans la littérature, et elle se fonde sur les travaux récents menés sur les États américains. Le menu des options de politiques publiques disponibles dans le contexte canadien est enfin évalué, afin d’examiner les performances relatives des diverses règles existantes. La dernière partie propose une analyse économétrique de l’effet de la sévérité des règles sur les finances publiques des 10 provinces canadiennes sur la période 1980-2012. Parmi les résultats significatifs, il est confirmé que l’existence de règles contraignantes réduit substantiellement le niveau de dette nette tout en contrôlant pour les facteurs socio-économiques et politiques susceptibles d’affecter le niveau de dette par ailleurs.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2015s-10.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2015s-10.

as
in new window

Length: 60 pages
Date of creation: 26 Feb 2015
Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-10
Contact details of provider: Postal:
1130 rue Sherbrooke Ouest, suite 1400, Montréal, Quéc, H3A 2M8

Phone: (514) 985-4000
Fax: (514) 985-4039
Web page: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Jordi Galí & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal policy and monetary integration in Europe," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 533-572, October.
  2. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  3. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May.
  4. Lars Calmfors & Simon Wren‐Lewis, 2011. "What should fiscal councils do?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 26(68), pages 649-695, October.
  5. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(4), pages 147-174, Fall.
  6. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
  7. Chaney, Barbara A. & Copley, Paul A. & Stone, Mary S., 2002. "The effect of fiscal stress and balanced budget requirements on the funding and measurement of state pension obligations," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 287-313.
  8. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
  9. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  10. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2003. "The Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1419-1447.
  11. Christopher Crowe & Ellen E. Meade, 2007. "The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 69-90, Fall.
  12. Poterba, James M., 1995. "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence From the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(3), pages 329-336, September.
  13. Alberto Alesina & Tamim Bayoumi, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Fiscal Rules: Evidence from U.S. States," NBER Working Papers 5614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Kydland, Finn E. & Prescott, Edward C., 1980. "Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 79-91, May.
  15. Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2006. "Sub-central government fiscal rules," OECD Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(2), pages 141-181.
  16. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
  17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2010. "Growth in a Time of Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 573-578, May.
  18. Xavier Debrun & David Hauner & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2009. "Independent Fiscal Agencies," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 44-81, 02.
  19. John Considine, 2002. "Budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline: Edmund Burke's insightful contribution," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(4), pages 591-607.
  20. Fatas, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2006. "The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the US states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 101-117, January.
  21. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
  22. Helmut Stix, 2013. "Does the Broad Public Want to Consolidate Public Debt? – The Role of Fairness and of Policy Credibility," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 102-129, 02.
  23. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Positive and normative theories of public debt and inflation in historical perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(2-3), pages 337-344, April.
  24. Alan J. Auerbach, 2008. "Federal Budget Rules: The US Experience," NBER Working Papers 14288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Momi Dahan & Michel Strawczynski, 2010. "Fiscal Rules and Composition Bias in OECD Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 3088, CESifo Group Munich.
  26. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, 09.
  27. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
  28. Jonathan Millar, 1997. "The Effects of Budget Rules on Fiscal Performance and Macroeconomic Stabilization," Staff Working Papers 97-15, Bank of Canada.
  29. Poterba, James M, 1994. "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 799-821, August.
  30. Signe Krogstrup & Sébastien Wälti, 2008. "Do fiscal rules cause budgetary outcomes?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 123-138, July.
  31. Jordi Gali & Roberto Perotti, 2003. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe," NBER Working Papers 9773, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. Levinson, Arik, 1998. "Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence From the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(4), pages 715-732, December.
  33. Sonia Paty & Etienne Farvaque, 2008. "Economie de la démocratie," Post-Print halshs-00418874, HAL.
  34. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
  35. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  36. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1995. "Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 32-48, March.
  37. Alberto Alesina, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-678.
  38. Levinson, Arik, 1998. "Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 4), pages 715-32, December.
  39. Stephen Tapp, 2013. "The Use and Effectiveness of Fiscal Rules in Canadian Provinces," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 39(1), pages 45-70, March.
  40. Farvaque, Étienne & Foucault, Martial & Joanis, Marcelin, 2012. "Les règles budgétaires dans les provinces canadiennes : nomenclatures et éléments d’analyse," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(3), pages 281-315, Septembre.
  41. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
  42. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
  43. H. Badinger, 2009. "Fiscal rules, discretionary fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability: an empirical assessment for OECD countries," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(7), pages 829-847.
  44. Paolo Manasse, 2007. "Deficit Limits and Fiscal Rules for Dummies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 54(3), pages 455-473, July.
  45. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
  46. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
  47. Wildavsky, Aaron, 1985. "A cultural theory of expenditure growth and (Un)balanced budgets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 349-357, December.
  48. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
  49. Poterba, James M., 1995. "Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal Policy: Evidence From the States," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 48(3), pages 329-36, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2015s-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Webmaster)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.