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Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks

Author

Listed:
  • Falilou Fall

    (OECD)

  • Debra Bloch

    (OECD)

  • Jean-Marc Fournier

    (OECD)

  • Peter Hoeller

    (OECD)

Abstract

The sharp rise in debt experienced by most OECD countries raises questions about debt indicators and the prudent government debt level countries should target. It also raises questions about the fiscal frameworks needed to reach the prudent debt level and to accommodate cyclical fluctuations along the convergence path towards a prudent debt target. The objective of this paper is to define long-run prudent debt targets for OECD countries and country-specific fiscal rules. The paper presents a comprehensive analysis of government liabilities and assets and formulates recommendations for debt indicators. It also reviews the different linkages between government debt and the economic activity. The lessons from these analyses are combined with an assessment of the uncertainties surrounding the development of macroeconomic variables to define a prudent debt target. Different fiscal rules are compared with regard their impact on fiscal discipline and the risk of recession for country-specific fiscal rules recommendations. Cibles de dette prudentes et cadres budgétaires La montée rapide de l’endettement public dans la plupart des pays de l'OCDE soulève des questions sur le niveau prudent de dette que les pays doivent cibler. Il soulève également des questions sur les cadres budgétaires nécessaires pour les atteindre et qui fournissent une marge de manœuvre suffisante pour faire face à des chocs négatifs. Ce document examine les dettes publiques explicites et implicites, ainsi que les actifs qui sont utiles dans l'évaluation des risques budgétaires et la viabilité budgétaire à long terme. Il souligne également les liens positifs et négatifs entre la dette publique et l'activité économique. Les leçons tirées de ces analyses sont combinées avec une évaluation des incertitudes macroéconomiques pour définir une cible prudente de dette. Différentes règles budgétaires sont comparées à l'égard de leur impact sur la discipline budgétaire et le risque de récession, conduisant à des recommandations pour les règles budgétaires qui tiennent compte des spécificités de chaque pays.

Suggested Citation

  • Falilou Fall & Debra Bloch & Jean-Marc Fournier & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks," OECD Economic Policy Papers 15, OECD Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:oec:ecoaab:15-en
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrxtjmmt9f7-en
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrice Ollivaud, 2017. "Improving the allocation and efficiency of public spending in Indonesia," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1381, OECD Publishing.
    2. Debra Bloch & Falilou Fall, 2016. "Government Debt Indicators:Understanding the Data," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 1-28, February.
    3. Bassanetti , Antonio & Cottarelli , Carlo & Presbitero, Andrea, 2016. "Lost and Found: Market Access and Public Debt Dynamics," SEP Working Papers 2016/5, LUISS School of European Political Economy.
    4. Jean-Marc Fournier & Falilou Fall, 2015. "Limits to government debt sustainability," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 1229, OECD Publishing.
    5. repec:eee:ecmode:v:66:y:2017:i:c:p:30-41 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    debt; dette; fiscal policy; fiscal rules; politique budgétaire; règle budgétaire;

    JEL classification:

    • E27 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H68 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt

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