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The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact

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  • Nerlich, Carolin
  • Reuter, Wolf Heinrich

Abstract

This study analyses the link between fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact. We look at different features of national numerical fiscal rules in combination with fiscal councils and medium-term budgeting frameworks. We construct our own time-varying dataset for national fiscal frameworks for the period 1990-2012 covering all 27 EU Member States and estimate a dynamic panel on aggregate and disaggregated fiscal policy variables. We find strong support that numerical fiscal rules help to improve the primary balance, and that the budgetary impact can be further strengthened when supported by independent fiscal councils and an effective medium-term budgeting framework. JEL Classification: E61, E62, H60

Suggested Citation

  • Nerlich, Carolin & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2013. "The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact," Working Paper Series 1588, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20131588
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tóth, Csaba G., 2017. "Own or inherited? The effect of national fiscal rules after changes of government," MPRA Paper 81178, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Julia Bachtrögler & Harald Badinger & Aurélien Fichet de Clairfontaine & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2014. "Summarizing Data using Partially Ordered Set Theory: An Application to Fiscal Frameworks in 97 Countries," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp181, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Roel M. W. J. Beetsma & Xavier Debrun, 2016. "Fiscal Councils; Rationale and Effectiveness," IMF Working Papers 16/86, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Robertson, D. & Tambakis, D., 2016. "Long-Run Debt Ratios with Fiscal Fatigue," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1674, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Maltritz, Dominik & Wüste, Sebastian, 2015. "Determinants of budget deficits in Europe: The role and relations of fiscal rules, fiscal councils, creative accounting and the Euro," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 222-236.
    6. Falilou Fall & Debra Bloch & Jean-Marc Fournier & Peter Hoeller, 2015. "Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks," OECD Economic Policy Papers 15, OECD Publishing.
    7. Michal Horvath, 2017. "European Fiscal Compact in Action: Can Independent Fiscal Institutions Deliver Effective Oversight?," Discussion Papers Discussion Paper No. 1/20, Council for Budget Responsibility.
    8. Nerlich, Carolin & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2015. "Fiscal rules, fiscal space and procyclical fiscal policy," Working Paper Series 1872, European Central Bank.
    9. Asatryan, Zareh & Debrun, Xavier & Heinemann, Friedrich & Horvath, Michal & Ódor, Ľudovít & Yeter, Mustafa, 2017. "Making the most of the European Fiscal Board," ZEW policy briefs 3/2017, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    10. repec:eee:poleco:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:69-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2015. "Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112800, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    12. Toshihiro Ihori, 2014. "Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-920, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    13. Harald Badinger & Aurélien Fichet de Clairfontaine & Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2017. "Fiscal Rules and Twin Deficits: The Link between Fiscal and External Balances," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 21-35, January.
    14. Toshihiro Ihori, 2015. "Flexibility of Deficit Ceiling and Income Fluctuation," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 11(2), pages 231-246, March.
    15. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2015. "National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with, but still effective?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 67-81.
    16. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Yariv, Leeat, 2015. "Collective Self Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 10458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2016. "Design of fiscal frameworks and compliance with fiscal rules in CESEE," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 29-40.
    18. repec:ksa:szemle:1732 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard, 2016. "Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-19.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal council; fiscal framework; fiscal policy; fiscal rules; medium term budgeting framework;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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