Fiscal Behaviour in the European Union: Rules, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Indebtedness
We assess the fiscal behaviour in the European Union countries for the period 1990- 2005 via the responsiveness of budget balances to several determinants. The results show that the existence of effective fiscal rules, the degree of public spending decentralization, and the electoral cycle can impinge on the country’s fiscal position. Furthermore, the results also support the responsiveness of primary balances to government indebtedness. Key words: fiscal regimes, fiscal rules, fiscal decentralization, European Union, panel data
|Date of creation:||Mar 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL|
Web page: https://aquila1.iseg.ulisboa.pt/aquila/departamentos/EC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nickell, Stephen J, 1981. "Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1417-26, November.
- António Afonso, 2005.
"Ricardian Fiscal Regimes in the European Union,"
Working Papers Department of Economics
2005/18, ISEG - School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, University of Lisbon.
- William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp232009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vitor Escaria)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.