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National fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Amélie Barbier-Gauchard
  • Kea Baret
  • Alexandru Minea

Abstract

Motivated by the fiscal imbalances in the EU countries in the recent period, this paper analyzes the effect of national fiscal rules on fiscal discipline. Using a careful definition of national fiscal rules combined with a novel measure of fiscal discipline (the Global Financial Performance Index – GFPI), propensity score matching estimations that account for potential endogeneity reveal that fiscal rules significantly improve the GFPI. However, this favourable effect dramatically depends upon the type of fiscal rule and different structural factors. These two features, together with alternative measures of fiscal discipline, are found to be key ingredients that should be taken into account when assessing the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal discipline.

Suggested Citation

  • Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Kea Baret & Alexandru Minea, 2021. "National fiscal rules and fiscal discipline in the European Union," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(20), pages 2337-2359, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:53:y:2021:i:20:p:2337-2359
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2020.1859453
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    Cited by:

    1. Ablam Estel Apeti & Bao We Wal Bambe & Jean-Louis Combes, 2025. "On the macroeconomic effects of fiscal reforms: fiscal rules and public expenditure efficiency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 205(1), pages 19-47, October.
    2. Carolina Ulloa-Suárez & Oscar Valencia & Jorge Guerra, 2025. "Flexible Boundaries: Evaluating the Effect of Escape Clause Activation," Working Papers of BETA 2025-05, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    3. Apeti, Ablam Estel & Bambe, Bao-We-Wal & Combes, Jean-Louis & Edoh, Eyah Denise, 2024. "Original sin: Fiscal rules and government debt in foreign currency in developing countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    4. Jocelyne Zoumenou & Antonia Lopez Villavicencio, 2024. "Do Binding Fiscal Rules Enhance Fiscal Stability? Evidence from European Union Countries," Working Papers hal-04730739, HAL.
    5. Kea BARET, 2021. "Fiscal rules’ compliance and Social Welfare," Working Papers of BETA 2021-38, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    6. Robert Kraemer & Jonne Lehtimäki, 2023. "Government debt: the impact of fiscal rules at the European and national level," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 783-805, August.
    7. Kéa Baret & Amélie Barbier-Gauchard & Théophilos Papadimitriou, 2021. "Forecasting the Stability and Growth Pact compliance using Machine Learning," Working Papers of BETA 2021-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    8. Barbier-Gauchard, Amélie & Betti, Thierry & Metz, Théo, 2025. "Fiscal multipliers, public debt anchor and government credibility in a behavioural macroeconomic model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 90(PA).
    9. Robert Kraemer & Jonne Lehtimäki, 2024. "Government debt, European Institutions and fiscal rules: a synthetic control approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(4), pages 1112-1157, August.
    10. Omid M. Ardakani & N. Kundan Kishor & Suyong Song, 2024. "Does membership of the EMU matter for economic and financial outcomes?," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 416-447, July.
    11. Andrián, Leandro & Hirs-Garzon, Jorge & Urrea, Ivan Leonardo & Valencia, Oscar, 2024. "Fiscal rules and economic cycles: Quality (always) Matters," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    12. Cezara Vinturis, 2023. "How do fiscal rules shape governments' spending behavior?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 61(2), pages 322-341, April.
    13. Sawadogo, Rayangnewendé Frans, 2024. "Do fiscal rules shape private-sector investment decisions?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    14. Carlos Fonseca Marinheiro, 2021. "The Expenditure Benchmark: Complex and Unsuitable for Independent Fiscal Institutions," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 63(3), pages 411-431, September.
    15. Kea BARET, 2021. "Fiscal rules’ compliance and Social Welfare," Working Papers of BETA 2021-50, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    16. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-03121966 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-04130477 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Jocelyne Zoumenou, 2023. "On the impact of fiscal policy on inflation: The case of fiscal rules," EconomiX Working Papers 2023-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    19. López-Herrera, Carmen & Cordero, José M. & Pedraja-Chaparro, Francisco & Polo, Cristina, 2023. "Fiscal rules and their influence on public sector efficiency," MPRA Paper 119018, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Căpraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2022. "Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).

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