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Targeting the Structural Balance

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Listed:
  • Laura dos Reis
  • Paolo Manasse
  • Ugo Panizza

Abstract

This paper discusses whether a country should conduct fiscal policy by targeting a structural (or cyclically adjusted) fiscal balance. The paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the concept of cyclically adjusted balance (CAB) and points out practical and conceptual problems related to the interpretation and the measurement of a CAB. The second section discusses the theoretical rationale for having a fiscal rule in general and a rule defined in terms of a cyclically adjusted balance in particular. The third section discusses conceptual and practical problems with adopting fiscal rules and rules that target the structural balance.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura dos Reis & Paolo Manasse & Ugo Panizza, 2007. "Targeting the Structural Balance," Research Department Publications 4507, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4507
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    Cited by:

    1. Fanelli, José María & Jiménez, Juan Pablo, 2009. "Crisis, volatility and fiscal policy in Latin America," Documentos de Proyectos 4167, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Gómez Sabaini, Juan Carlos & Jiménez, Juan Pablo, 2009. "El papel de la política tributaria frente a la crisis: límites y posibilidades," Documentos de Proyectos 4166, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    3. -, 2009. "Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives," Documentos de Proyectos 3665, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    4. Gómez Sabaini, Juan Carlos & Jiménez, Juan Pablo, 2009. "The role of tax policy in the context of the crisis: possibilities and limitations," Documentos de Proyectos 4169, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    5. Andersen, Torben M., 2013. "Fiscal policy targeting under imperfect information," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-130.
    6. Kacef, Osvaldo, 2009. "Crisis and public policies in Latin America and the Caribbean," Documentos de Proyectos 4168, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    7. Sorin Gabriel Anton & Cristina Puiu, 2014. "The Imf Approach Towards The Structural Deficit," Journal of Public Administration, Finance and Law, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 0(Special i), pages 44-49, September.
    8. Giovanni Andrea Cornia & Juan Carlos Gómez-Sabaini & Bruno Martorano, 2012. "A New Fiscal Pact, Tax Policy Changes and Income Inequality," Working Papers - Economics wp2012_03.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    9. -, 2009. "Políticas macroeconómicas en tiempos de crisis: opciones y perspectivas," Documentos de Proyectos 3664, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    10. Fanelli, José María & Jiménez, Juan Pablo, 2009. "Crisis, volatilidad y política fiscal en América Latina," Documentos de Proyectos 4165, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    11. Kacef, Osvaldo, 2009. "Crisis y políticas públicas en América Latina y el Caribe," Documentos de Proyectos 4164, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    12. Cornia, Giovanni Andrea & Martorano, Bruno, 2011. "A New Fiscal Pact, Tax Policy Changes and Income Inequality," WIDER Working Paper Series 070, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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