Fiscal Discipline: Rules Rather Than Institutions
The lack of fiscal discipline is a natural and pervasive implication of the perceived separation between the benefits from public spending and the taxes that individuals and interest groups receive and pay, respectively. The implication is that budget preparation, decision and execution must be constrained. The challenge is that the policymakers who need to be constrained are those who must decide the constraints. Two broad classes of solutions are possible: institutions that shape the budgetary process and quantitative rules that set limits. The mounting experience with both institutions and rules is disappointing, for reasons that are often complementary. Examining the reasons for this state of affairs, this article argues that institutions and rules ought to be combined and associated with advisory fiscal councils.
Volume (Year): 217 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Smith Square, London SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 (020) 7222 7665
Fax: +44 (020) 7654 1900
Web page: http://www.niesr.ac.uk
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:niesru:v:217:y:2011:i:1:p:r19-r30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publishing)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.