Fiskální pravidla v zemích Visegrádské čtyřky
[Fiscal Rules in the Visegrad Countries]
Recently the popularity of fiscal rules has been increasing also due to the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks on fiscal sustainability. This paper reviews supranational and national fiscal rules implemented in the Visegrad countries (V4). Namely, we base the review and comparison of fiscal rules on the existing literature and the empirical data from the European Commission. According to the Fiscal Rule Strength Index developed by the European Commission, Poland’s debt rule as of 1997 received the highest ranking. Poland also received the highest score based on the aggregated Fiscal Rules Index in 2009. The most influential in this respect is the application of an early adjustment mechanism which is triggered once the debt to GDP ratio exceeds 50%.
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- Xavier Debrun, 2006. "Tying hands is not commitment: can fiscal rules and institutions really enhance fiscal discipline?," Working Papers 48, Bruegel.
- Melecky, Martin, 2009. "The Effect of Institutions, Geography, Development Assistance and Debt Crises on Public-Debt Management," MPRA Paper 16332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Xavier Debrun & Laurent Moulin & Alessandro Turrini & Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2008. "Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 297-362, 04.
- Iara, Anna & Wolff, Guntram B., 2014.
"Rules and risk in the Euro area,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 222-236.
- Melecky, Martin, 2007. "A cross-country analysis of public debt management strategies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4287, The World Bank.
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