Moral Hazard and Bail-Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder
We identify investor moral hazard in the German fiscal federation. Our identification strategy is based on a variable, which was used by the German Federal Constitutional Court as an indicator to determine eligibility of two German states (Länder) to a bail-out, the interest payments-to-revenue ratio. While risk premia measured in the German sub-national bond market react significantly to the relative debt level of a state (Land), we also find that a larger interest payments-to-revenue ratio counter-intuitively lowers risk premia significantly. Furthermore, with increasing values the risk premia decrease more strongly. This is evidence of investor moral hazard, because a larger indicator value increases the likelihood of receiving a bail-out payment. Our findings are robust to a variety of sample changes. In addition, we provide a case study of the recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling on the Land Berlin, which had filed for additional federal funds. The negative response of the court did not lead to a change in financial markets' bail-out expectations. In sum, our results indicate significant investor moral hazard in the sub-national German bond market. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 61 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edwin J. Elton & T. Clifton Green, 1998. "Tax and Liquidity Effects in Pricing Government Bonds," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(5), pages 1533-1562, October.
- Lee, Jong-Wha & Shin, Kwanho, 2008.
"IMF bailouts and moral hazard,"
Journal of International Money and Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 816-830, September.
- Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti & Nouriel Roubini, 1998.
"Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis,"
NBER Working Papers
6783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lorenzo Codogno & Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2003. "Yield spreads on EMU government bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 503-532, October.
- Grossman, S.J. & Miller, M.H., 1988.
"Liquidity And Market Structure,"
88, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
- Bernoth, Kerstin & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006.
"Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia,"
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies
2006,19, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Fool The Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency And Sovereign Risk Premia," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(4), pages 465-487, 09.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram Wolff, 2006. "Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia," DNB Working Papers 103, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Guntram B. Wolff, 2006. "Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia," CESifo Working Paper Series 1732, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2004.
"Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market,"
ZEI Working Papers
B 26-2003, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Bernoth, Kerstin & von Hagen, Jürgen & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2004. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," Working Paper Series 0369, European Central Bank.
- Heppke-Falk, Kirsten H. & Hüfner, Felix P., 2004. "Expected budget deficits and interest rate swap spreads - Evidence for France, Germany and Italy," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2004,40, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Favero, Carlo A. & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2004.
"Inflation Targeting and Debt: Lessons from Brazil,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4376, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Steven Phillips & Timothy D. Lane, 2000. "Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?," IMF Working Papers 00/168, International Monetary Fund.
- Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael J. Fleming, 2003.
"Measuring treasury market liquidity,"
Economic Policy Review,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 83-108.
- Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni & Schnabel, Isabel & Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, 2006. "How Do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of Investing in Emerging Markets?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1689-1714, October.
- Jan J.G. Lemmen, 1999. "Managing Government Default Risk in Federal States," FMG Special Papers sp116, Financial Markets Group.
- Hallerberg, Mark & Wolff, Guntram B., 2006. "Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2006,35, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Seitz, Helmut, 1999. "Subnational government bailouts in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 20-1999, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
- Gomez-Puig, Marta, 2006. "Size matters for liquidity: Evidence from EMU sovereign yield spreads," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 156-162, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:61:y:2008:i:3:p:425-446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.