IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/zeiwps/b201999.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Subnational government bailouts in Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Seitz, Helmut

Abstract

The paper presents an investigation of subnational government bailouts in Germany. In a first part we briefly describe the fiscal federalism system in Germany. The main part of the paper examines the bailout of two West German states. We identify the causes of the financial trouble of both states and examine the institutional settings that forced the federal government to provide bailout transfers. In addition, we investigate the impact these transfers had on the fiscal performance of both Länder. In a further section we provide evidence on bailouts of local governments by the German Länder. A final section summarizes our results and presents policy conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Seitz, Helmut, 1999. "Subnational government bailouts in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 20-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b201999
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/39584/1/308369556.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. János Kornai, 2014. "The soft budget constraint," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 64(supplemen), pages 25-79, November.
    2. Homburg, Stefan, 1996. "Notwendigkeit einer Finanzreform," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 76(7), pages 336-338.
    3. von Hagen, Jurgen & Eichengreen, Barry, 1996. "Federalism, Fiscal Restraints, and European Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 134-138, May.
    4. Stuart Landon & Constance E. Smith, 2000. "Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 634-661, August.
    5. Homburg, Stefan, 1994. "Anreizwirkungen des deutschen Finanzausgleichs," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 312-330..
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ernesto Crivelli, 2011. "Subnational fiscal behavior under the expectation of federal bailouts," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(1), pages 41-57.
    2. Emanuel Kohlscheen, 2008. "Debt Bailouts And Constitutions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 46(3), pages 480-492, July.
    3. Thiess Buettner & Robert Schwager & Sebastian Hauptmeier, 2011. "Efficient Revenue Sharing and Upper-Level Governments: Theory and Application to Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 647-667, December.
    4. Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Bail-Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 425-446, August.
    5. Sola, Sergio & Palomba, Geremia, 2016. "Sub-nationals' risk premia in fiscal federations: Fiscal performance and institutional design," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 165-187.
    6. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975–2005," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 114-127.
    7. Ernesto Crivelli & Klaas Staal, 2013. "Size, spillovers and soft budget constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 338-356, April.
    8. Lars P. Feld, 2004. "Le fédéralisme financier en Allemagne: Coopération ou concurrence?," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200416, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    9. Zarko Kalamov & Klaas Staal, 2016. "Public debt, bailouts, and common bonds," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(4), pages 670-692, August.
    10. Crivelli, Ernesto & Staal, Klaas, 2006. "Size and soft budget constraints," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 172, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. Wildasin, David E., 2004. "The Institutions of Federalism: Toward an Analytical Framework," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 57(2), pages 247-272, June.
    12. Virkola, Tuomo, 2014. "Fiscal Federalism in Four Federal Countries," ETLA Reports 38, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    13. Achten-Gozdowski, Jennifer, 2018. "Geschichte und Politökonomie deutscher Theatersubventionen
      [History and Political Economy of Public Subsidies for German Theatres and Operas]
      ," MPRA Paper 85087, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Berthold, Norbert & Fricke, Holger & Kullas, Matthias, 2004. "Mehr institutioneller Wettbewerb in Deutschland: Wirksame Hilfe für die neuen Bundesländer," Discussion Paper Series 73, Julius Maximilian University of Würzburg, Chair of Economic Order and Social Policy.
    15. Breuillé, Marie-Laure & Vigneault, Marianne, 2010. "Overlapping soft budget constraints," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 259-269, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b201999. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/zeibnde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.