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Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation

Author

Listed:
  • Stuart Landon
  • Constance E. Smith

Abstract

Estimates are presented for the impact of debt accumulation by the central and subcentral governments of a federation on the creditworthiness of other federation member governments. The estimates, calculated using an ordered probit model and Canadian provincial data, indicate that debt accumulation by the central government has reduced the creditworthiness of indebted provincial governments. Interprovincial debt accumulation effects are negative but relatively small, except for the debt of the largest province, which has a strong positive effect on the creditworthiness of the other provinces. These findings may have implications for other federations and associated jurisdictions, such as the European Union.

Suggested Citation

  • Stuart Landon & Constance E. Smith, 2000. "Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(3), pages 634-661, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:3:p:634-661
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    Cited by:

    1. Borck, Rainald & Fossen, Frank M. & Freier, Ronny & Martin, Thorsten, 2015. "Race to the debt trap? — Spatial econometric evidence on debt in German municipalities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 20-37.
    2. Jean‐Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2008. "Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(6), pages 1143-1168, December.
    3. Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Osterloh, Steffen, 2017. "Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules – The Swiss experience," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 319-343.
    4. Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2012. "Soft budget constraints and strategic interactions in subnational borrowing: Evidence from the German States, 1975–2005," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 114-127.
    5. Beck, Roland & Ferrucci, Gianluigi & Hantzsche, Arno & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2017. "Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads – The role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 72-98.
    6. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/1482 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Hattori, Takahiro & Miyake, Hiroki, 2015. "Empirical Analysis of Yield Determinants in Japan’s Municipal Bond Market: Does Credit Risk Premium Exist?," MPRA Paper 67127, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo.
    9. Roberto Fernández Llera, 2016. "Control del endeudamiento autonómico y estabilidad presupuestaria: Evolución y propuestas de futuro," Revista de Estudios Regionales, Universidades Públicas de Andalucía, vol. 1, pages 103-136.
    10. Galvani, Valentina & Behnamian, Aslan, 2009. "A Comparative Analysis of the Returns on Provincial and Federal Canadian Bonds," Working Papers 2009-7, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    11. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance E., 2007. "Government debt spillovers in a monetary union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 135-154, August.
    12. Luigi De Iaco & Domenicantonio Fausto, 2006. "Public Debt and Federalist Reform," QA - Rivista dell'Associazione Rossi-Doria, Associazione Rossi Doria, issue 1, January.
    13. Helmut Seitz, 2000. "Subnational Bailouts in Germany," Research Department Publications 3097, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    14. Seitz, Helmut, 1999. "Subnational government bailouts in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 20-1999, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
    15. Baniak Andrzej & Grajzl Peter, 2013. "Equilibrium and Welfare in a Model of Torts with Industry Reputation Effects," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 265-302, October.
    16. Eva Jenkner & Zhongjin Lu, 2014. "Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts; Who Pays the Premium?," IMF Working Papers 14/20, International Monetary Fund.
    17. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/9909 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Basse, Tobias, 2020. "Solvency II and sovereign credit risk: Additional empirical evidence and some thoughts about implications for regulators and lawmakers," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    19. Laurence Booth & George Georgopoulos & Walid Hejazi, 2007. "What drives provincial‐Canada yield spreads?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(3), pages 1008-1032, August.
    20. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. Van Hecke, Annelore, 2013. "Vertical debt spillovers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 468-492.
    22. Andrés Leal Marcos & Julio López Laborda, 2009. "Efectos externos del endeudamiento sobre la calificación crediticia de las Comunidades Autónomas," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 189(2), pages 81-106, June.
    23. Charles B. Blankart & Achim Klaiber, 2006. "Subnational Government Organisation And Public Debt Crises," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 48-54, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration

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