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L'économie expérimentale pour l'analyse de modifications au système centralisé de vente du quota laitier au Québec

Author

Listed:
  • Maurice Doyon
  • Lota Dabio Tamini
  • Virginie Simard
  • Kent Messer
  • Harry M. Kaiser

Abstract

This study experimentally tests whether a modification to the centralized quota sales system is capable of lowering the price of the milk quota in Québec, while at the same time minimizing the negative impacts on the auction's efficiency. This modification consists of applying two treatments on the uniformed price auction used to trade dairy production quota.. The first treatment excludes 5% or 15% of the sellers and the vendors' highest bids. The second treatment applies a tax of 2% or 10% to the units that the vendors put on the market but don't manage to sell. Different combinations of these two treatments are also tested. The generated data shows that the highest bids exclusion mechanism allows to lower the price of the quota, the 15% exclusion being more conclusive than the 5% one. Alternatively, the tax by itself has little impact on the price of the quota, while the combination of the two treatments causes a more important diminution of the number of transactions and of the price of the quota than when the tax treatment and the exclusion treatment are applied individually. This has as a consequence to lead to a greater loss of economic efficiency. La présente étude teste de manière expérimentale la capacité d'une modification au système centralisé de vente du quota (SCVQ) à faire diminuer le prix du quota laitier au Québec tout en minimisant les impacts négatifs des changements sur l'efficacité de l'enchère. Cette modification consiste à appliquer deux traitements sur l'enchère de prix uniforme où s'échange le quota. Le premier traitement consiste en une exclusion (de 5 % ou de 15 %) des mises les plus élevées des acheteurs et des vendeurs. Le second traitement est une taxe (de 2 % ou de 10 %) appliquée aux unités que les vendeurs mettent en marché et ne réussissent pas à vendre. Différentes combinaisons de ces deux traitements sont également testées. Les données générées permettent de conclure que le mécanisme d'exclusion des mises les plus élevées permet de faire diminuer le prix du quota, l'exclusion de 15 % étant plus efficace que celle de 5 %. Pour sa part, la taxe seule a peu d'impact sur le prix du quota tandis que la combinaison des deux traitements entraîne une diminution du nombre de transactions et du prix du quota plus marquée que lorsque les traitements de taxe et d'exclusion sont appliqués individuellement. Cela a comme corollaire d'entraîner une perte d'efficacité économique plus importante.

Suggested Citation

  • Maurice Doyon & Lota Dabio Tamini & Virginie Simard & Kent Messer & Harry M. Kaiser, 2006. "L'économie expérimentale pour l'analyse de modifications au système centralisé de vente du quota laitier au Québec," CIRANO Working Papers 2006s-23, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2006s-23
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    File URL: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2006s-23.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    exclusion; experimental economics; quota; taxation; uniform price auctions; enchères de prix uniformes; exclusion; économie expérimentale; quota; taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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