Single Bid Restriction in Milk Quota Exchanges - Comparing the Danish and the Ontario Exchanges
This paper analyzes the design of the Danish milk quota exchange. We focus on the restriction that each producer can only submit a single bid (a quantity and a price limit). We argue that this restriction creates inefficiencies for two reasons. First, a single bid cannot express a buyer's downward sloping demand curve (the aggregation effect). Second, the buyers minimize the risk of foregoing profitable trade by submitting their average valuation rather than their marginal valuation of quota (the uncertainty effect). We use data from the (multiple bids) Ontario milk quota exchange, to evaluate the empirical impact of a single bid restriction.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nautz, D., 1995. "Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 301-306, June.
- Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,"
- Boots, Maroeska & Oude Lansink, Alfons & Peerlings, Jack, 1997. "Efficiency Loss Due to Distortions in Dutch Milk Quota Trade," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 24(1), pages 31-46.
- Ann C. Ewasechko & Theodore M. Horbulyk, 1995. "Interprovincial Reallocation of Market Sharing Quota for Industrial Milk," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 43(2), pages 191-202, 07.
- Rucker, Randal R & Thurman, Walter N & Sumner, Daniel A, 1995. "Restricting the Market for Quota: An Analysis of Tobacco Production Rights with Corroboration from Congressional Testimony," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 142-75, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:rvaewp:24181. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.