IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Optimal Bidding Strategies in Non-Sealed Bid Online Auctions of Common Products with Quantity Uncertainty

  • Chonawee Supatgiat

    (Tractebel North America)

  • John R. Birge

    (Northwestern University)

  • Rachel Q. Zhang

    (Cornell University)

We consider non-sealed bid online auctions of common products with quantity uncertainty. Both first-price (also known as pay-as-you-bid) and uniform-price auctions are considered. In these auctions, all bidders have the same valuation of the products but may have different demand quantities. The number of units being auctioned can be random with a known and common distribution. Each bidder decides on a bidding price to maximize her profit. We derive Nash equilibrium solutions, i.e., bidders' optimal bidding strategies, and the resulting market clearing prices.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0211/0211005.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0211005.

as
in new window

Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 10 Nov 2002
Date of revision: 05 Mar 2003
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0211005
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32 . working paper, please give us your comments.
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://128.118.178.162

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Rothkopf, Michael H. & Harstad, Ronald M., 1994. "On the role of discrete bid levels in oral auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 572-581, May.
  2. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
  3. Supatgiat, Chonawee & Zhang, Rachel Q & Birge, John R, 2001. "Equilibrium Values in a Competitive Power Exchange Market," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 17(1), pages 93-121, February.
  4. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-153106 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  6. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0211005. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.