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Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration

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  • Corrigan, Jay
  • Drichoutis, Andreas
  • Lusk, Jayson
  • Nayga, Rodolfo
  • Rousu, Matt

Abstract

It is generally thought that market outcomes are improved with the provision of market information. As a result, the use of repeated rounds with price feedback has become standard practice in the applied experimental auction valuation literature. We conducted two experiments to determine how rationally subjects behave with and without price feedback in a second price auction. Results from an auction for lotteries show that subjects exposed to price feedback are significantly more likely to commit preference reversals. However, this irrationality diminishes in later rounds. Results from an induced value auction indicate that price feedback caused greater deviations from the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Our results suggest that while bidding on the same item repeatedly improves auction outcomes, this improvement is not the result of price feedback.

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  • Corrigan, Jay & Drichoutis, Andreas & Lusk, Jayson & Nayga, Rodolfo & Rousu, Matt, 2011. "Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration," MPRA Paper 28337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28337
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    Cited by:

    1. Bruner, David M. & Huth, William L. & McEvoy, David M. & Morgan, O. Ashton, 2014. "Consumer Valuation of Food Safety: The Case of Postharvest Processed Oysters," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 43(2), August.
    2. Tiziana De Magistris & Teresa Del Giudice & Fabio Verneau, 2015. "The Effect of Information on Willingness to Pay for Canned Tuna Fish with Different Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Certification: A Pilot Study," Journal of Consumer Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 457-471, July.
    3. Loureiro, Maria L. & Gracia, Azucena & Nayga, Rodolfo M., 2013. "Do experimental auction estimates pass the scope test?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 7-17.
    4. Teresa Briz & Andreas Drichoutis & Lisa House, 2015. "Examining projection bias in experimental auctions: the role of hunger and immediate gratification," Agricultural and Food Economics, Springer;Italian Society of Agricultural Economics (SIDEA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-17, December.
    5. Kechagia, Varvara & Drichoutis, Andreas C., 2016. "The effect of olfactory sensory cues on economic decision making," MPRA Paper 75293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Levan Elbakidze & Rodolfo M. Nayga Jr. & Hao Li & Chris McIntosh, 2014. "Value elicitation for multiple quantities of a quasi-public good using open ended choice experiments and uniform price auctions," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 253-265, March.
    7. Iftekhar, Md Sayed & Tisdell, John G., 2015. "Bidding and performance in multiple unit combinatorial fishery quota auctions: Role of information feedbacks," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 233-243.
    8. repec:eee:soceco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:33-46 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Andreas C. Drichoutis & Rodolfo M. Nayga & Jayson L. Lusk & Panagiotis Lazaridis, 2012. "When a risky prospect is valued more than its best possible outcome," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 7(1), pages 1-18, January.
    10. repec:bla:jconsa:v:51:y:2017:i:2:p:312-328 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Li, Yingzi & Gallardo, R. Karina & McCracken, Vicki A. & Yue, Chengyan & Luby, James & McFerson, James R., 2014. "How does the revelation of previous bid affect new bid?," 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2014, Minneapolis, Minnesota 170439, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    12. Andreas C. Drichoutis & Stathis Klonaris & Georgia Papoutsi, 2016. "Do good things come in small packages? Willingness to pay for pomegranate wine and bottle size effects," Working Papers 2016-2, Agricultural University of Athens, Department Of Agricultural Economics.

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    Keywords

    bid affiliation; posted prices; induced value experiment; preference reversals; lotteries;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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