Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J. & Mazón, Cristina, 2016. "Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?," MPRA Paper 72827, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 2002.
"Tradeable carbon permit auctions: How and why to auction not grandfather,"
Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 333-345, March.
- Kerr, Suzi & Cramton, Peter, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," RFF Working Paper Series dp-98-34, Resources for the Future.
- Peter Cramton & Suzi Kerr, 2002. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Papers of Peter Cramton 02eptc, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 06 May 2002.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather," Discussion Papers 10668, Resources for the Future.
- Cramton, Peter & Kerr, Suzi, 1998. "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction, Not Grandfather," Working Papers 197846, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014.
"Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
- Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1995. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpdr, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 22 Jul 2002.
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009.
"Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets,"
The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I).
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009. "Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 355, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2009. "Market Power in Pollution Permit Markets," Working Papers 0906, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009.
"Auction Theory,"
Elsevier Monographs,
Elsevier,
edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973.
- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly-Moore, Kristin, 1994.
"Designing organizations for trading pollution rights,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 167-196, October.
- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly, Kristin E., "undated". "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights," Working Papers 838, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- John Ledyard & Kristin Szakaly-Moore, 1993. "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights," Experimental 9307001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Jul 1993.
- Cameron Hepburn & Michael Grubb & Karsten Neuhoff & Felix Matthes & Maximilien Tse, 2006.
"Auctioning of EU ETS phase II allowances: how and why?,"
Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 137-160, January.
- Hepburn, C. & Grubb, M. & Neuhoff, K. & Matthes , F. & Tse, M., 2006. "Auctioning of EU ETS Phase II allowances: how and why?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0644, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Cameron Hepburn & Michael Grubb & Karsten Neuhoff & Felix Matthes & Maximilien Tse, 2006. "Auctioning of EU ETS Phase II allowances: how and why?," Working Papers EPRG 0621, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
- Rajesh Singh & Quinn Weninger, 2017.
"Cap-and-trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(2), pages 357-407, August.
- Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2014. "Cap and Trade under Transactions Costs and Factor Irreversibility," Staff General Research Papers Archive 37453, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2016. "Cap and trade under transactions costs and factor irreversibility," ISU General Staff Papers 201607060700001021, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Singh, Rajesh & Weninger, Quinn, 2014. "Cap and Trade under Transactions Costs and Factor Irreversibility," Staff General Research Papers Archive 38127, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Karen Palmer & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, 2010.
"An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 514-525, 04-05.
- Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A. & Palmer, Karen & Shobe, William & Burtraw, Dallas, 2009. "An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits," RFF Working Paper Series dp-09-39, Resources for the Future.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Karen Palmer & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw, 2009. "An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits," IEW - Working Papers 429, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Francisco Alvarez & Cristina Mazón, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 35-70, September.
- Robert W. Hahn, 1984.
"Market Power and Transferable Property Rights,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(4), pages 753-765.
- Hahn, Robert W., 1982. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Working Papers 402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & Charles M. Kahn, 1998. "Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(2), pages 227-258.
- Jaime F. Zender & James J.D. Wang, 2002. "Auctioning divisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 673-705.
- Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2009. "Permit markets, market power, and the trade-off between efficiency and revenue raising," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 320-333, November.
- Kline, J. Jude & Menezes, Flavio M., 1999. "A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 183-189, November.
- Andrew Muller, R. & Mestelman, Stuart & Spraggon, John & Godby, Rob, 2002. "Can Double Auctions Control Monopoly and Monopsony Power in Emissions Trading Markets?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 70-92, July.
- Hagem, Cathrine & Westskog, Hege, 1998. "The Design of a Dynamic Tradeable Quota System under Market Imperfections," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 89-107, July.
- Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
- Alvarez Francisco & André Francisco J., 2016. "Auctioning Emission Permits with Market Power," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-28, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Liu, Yun & Tan, Bowen, 2021. "Consignment auctions revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
- Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2021.
"Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms,"
Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
- Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2018. "Revenue and efficiency in pollution permit allocation mechanisms," Discussion Papers Series 601, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Jae-Do Song & Young-Hwan Ahn, 2021. "Price Discovery of Consignment Auctions for Emission Permits," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-13, October.
- Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2021. "An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(4), pages 571-585, April.
- Gino Loyola, 2021. "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1527-1567, June.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting," MPRA Paper 61698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Francisco Álvarez & Francisco André, 2015. "Auctioning Versus Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 873-906, December.
- Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2013.
"Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information,"
Climate Change and Sustainable Development
162381, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Francisco Alvarez & Francisco J. André, 2013. "Auctioning vs. Grandfathering in Cap-and-Trade Systems with Market Power and Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2013.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Veronika Grimm & Lyuba Ilieva, 2013. "An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 308-338, December.
- Dormady, Noah C., 2014. "Carbon auctions, energy markets & market power: An experimental analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 468-482.
- Dormady, Noah C., 2013. "Market power in cap-and-trade auctions: A Monte Carlo approach," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 788-797.
- André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis Miguel, 2015. "Scarcity Rents and Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emissions Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," MPRA Paper 61770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010.
"Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
- Cassola, N. & Ewerhart , C. & Valla, N., 2006. "Declining Valuations and Equilibrium Bidding Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Working papers 151, Banque de France.
- Christian Ewerhart & Nuno Cassola & Natacha Valla, 2007. "Declining Valuations And Equilibrium Bidding In Central Bank Refinancing Operations," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 07-22, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2006. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," Working Paper Series 668, European Central Bank.
- Khezr, Peyman & MacKenzie, Ian A., 2018.
"Consignment auctions,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 42-51.
- Peyman Khezr & Ian A. MacKenzie, 2016. "Consignment auctions," Discussion Papers Series 558, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Francisco J. André & Luis M. de Castro, 2015.
"Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition,"
Working Papers
2015.06, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- André, Francisco J. & de Castro, Luis M., 2015. "Incentives for Price Manipulation in Emission Permit Markets with Stackelberg Competition," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 197636, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "Cuotas de Pesca y Libre Competencia: Algunas Reflexiones para la Nueva Ley de Pesca," Documentos de Trabajo 405, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Dormady, Noah & Healy, Paul J., 2019. "The consignment mechanism in carbon markets: A laboratory investigation," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, vol. 14(C), pages 51-65.
- Corina Haita-Falah, 2016. "Uncertainty and speculators in an auction for emissions permits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 315-343, June.
- Jae-Do Song & Young-Hwan Ahn, 2021. "Price Discovery of Consignment Auctions for Emission Permits," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-13, October.
- Alvarez, Francisco & Mazon, Cristina, 2007. "Comparing the Spanish and the discriminatory auction formats: A discrete model with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 179(1), pages 253-266, May.
- Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2009. "Multi-Unit Auctions and Competition Stricture," Working Papers 09-18, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1995. "Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 431-455, July.
- Haoran He & Yefeng Chen, 2021.
"Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 387-430, August.
- He, Haoran & Chen, Yefeng & Last Name, First Name, 2014. "Auction Mechanisms for Allocating Subsidies for Carbon Emissions Reduction: An Experimental Investigation," RFF Working Paper Series dp-14-06-efd, Resources for the Future.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003.
"Market power in tradable emission markets: a laboratory testbed for emission trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria,"
Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 469-491, October.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003. "Market Power in Tradable Emission Markets: A Laboratory Testbed for Emission Trading in Port Phillip Bay, Victoria," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia 57841, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Liu, Yun & Tan, Bowen, 2021. "Consignment auctions revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Emission permits; Uniform auction; Efficiency; Incomplete information simultaneous games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:67:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-017-1089-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.