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Cuotas de Pesca y Libre Competencia: Algunas Reflexiones para la Nueva Ley de Pesca

Author

Listed:
  • Juan-Pablo Montero

    (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)

Abstract

Hacia fines del 2012 debe entrar en vigencia una nueva ley de pesca en reemplazo de la actual Ley No. 19.713. Varios analistas han argumentado que la nueva ley se debe hacer cargo, entre otras cosas, de la baja competencia en el sector y de la falta de entrada de nuevos actores. En este trabajo se estudia la validez de estos argumentos a la luz de la teoría económica y de los datos provenientes de las pesquerías de la zona Centro-Sur que son las principales del país. El principal resultado del estudio es que no se observan problemas de libre competencia ni en los mercados de productos finales (v.gr., harina, aceite, conservas, congelados) ni en el mercado de transacción de cuotas individuales. A pesar de esto último, la autoridad debiera igualmente facilitar en la nueva ley una mayor transferibilidad de las cuotas, tal como ya ocurre en otras pesquerías en Chile. Se explica además que desde una perspectiva de libre competencia no hace diferencia si la asignación inicial de las cuotas individuales se realiza en base a capturas históricas o vía subasta, que es lo que proponen estos analistas. Por lo mismo, el uso de subastas responde a motivos de recaudación y distribución y esa es una discusión de economía política que se debiera mantener separada de los temas de libre competencia.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan-Pablo Montero, 2011. "Cuotas de Pesca y Libre Competencia: Algunas Reflexiones para la Nueva Ley de Pesca," Documentos de Trabajo 405, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:405
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    References listed on IDEAS

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