Multi-unit auctions with private information: an indivisible unit continuous price model
We construct a model of multi-unit auctions in which I bidders bid for two indivisible units of a common value good. Using a first-order approach, we find that there are equilibria in which bidders bid the same price for both units in the discriminatory auction, but not in the uniform auction. When there are only two bidders, under certain conditions, there are linear equilibria for both the discriminatory and the uniform auction formats. In all equilibria, bidders equalize the expected marginal benefit of bidding to the marginal costs of bidding. We show that comparison of the seller’s expected revenue across auction formats depends only on the ratio of the precision of private information to the precision of public information. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
Volume (Year): 51 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Krishna, Vijay, 2009.
edition 2, number 9780123745071.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2002. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124262973.
- Jaime F. Zender & James J.D. Wang, 2002. "Auctioning divisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 673-705.
- Brenner, Menachem & Galai, Dan & Sade, Orly, 2009. "Sovereign debt auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 267-274, March.
- Robert Wilson, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-689.
- Indranil Chakraborty, 2006. "Characterization of equilibrium in pay-as-bid auctions for multiple units," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 197-211, September.
- Noussair, Charles, 1995. "Equilibria in a Multi-object Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auction with Multi-unit Demands," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 337-351, March. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:51:y:2012:i:1:p:35-70. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.