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Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market

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  • Dimitri Vayanos

Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic model of a financial market with N strategic agents. Agents receive random stock endowments at each period and trade to share dividend risk. Endowments are the only private information in the model. We find that agents trade slowly even when the time between trades goes to 0. In fact, welfare loss due to strategic behaviour increases as the time between trades decreases. In the limit when the time between trades goes to 0, welfare loss is of order 1/N, and not 1/N2 as in the static models of the double auctions literature. The model is very tractable and closed-form solutions are obtained in a special case.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimitri Vayanos, 1999. "Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 219-254.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:2:p:219-254.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00086
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions

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