Auctioning Many Divisible Goods
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them. (JEL: D44) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.
Volume (Year): 2 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (04/05)
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