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Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale

  • Jean-François Richard
  • Jean-Pierre Florens
  • Olivier Armantier

[fre] Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale par Olivier Armantier, Jean-Pierre Florens et Jean-François Richard . Nous adoptons dans cet article la notion d'équilibre approximatif obtenu à partir d'une "règle intuitive". Cette notion repose sur l'idée qu'à la place des stratégies complexes à l'équilibre de Nash, les agents utilisent des règles de décision simples et fondées sur l'intuition et le bon sens. Nous appliquons ce concept à des données sur l'industrie spatiale et nous trouvons deux résultats principaux : (1) l'équilibre obtenu avec notre "règle intuitive" est une bonne approximation de l'équilibre de Nash ; (2) dans un jeu complexe une "règle intuitive" nous permet d'approximer un équilibre de Nash dont nous ne connaissons pas la forme structurelle. [eng] Approximate Equilibrium and an Intuitive Rule: An Application to Bid Tenders in the Space Industry by Olivier Armantier, Jean- Pierre Florens and Jean-François Richard . In this article, we adopt the notion of approximate equilibrium obtained from an "intuitive rule." The notion is based on the idea that, instead of complex Nash equilibrium strategies, agents use simple decision-making rules based on intuition and common sense. We apply this concept to data on the space industry and we come up with two main findings: (1) the equilibrium obtained with our "intuitive rule" provides a good approximation of the Nash equilibrium; (2) an "intuitive rule" enables us to approximate the Nash equilibrium with an unknown structural form in a complex game.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 132 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 179-190

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5907
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5907
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  1. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Robert W. Rosenthal, 1992. "Bargaining Rules of Thumb," Papers 0033, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Hervé & Vuong, Quang, 1991. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 7, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Rules of thumb in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-13, September.
  5. Wilson, Robert, 1992. "Strategic analysis of auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 227-279 Elsevier.
  6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
  7. Florens, Jean-Pierre & Hugo, Marie-Anne & Richard, Jean-François, 1996. "Game Theory Econometric Models: Application to Procurements in the Space Industry," IDEI Working Papers 62, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  9. Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 442-60, June.
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