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Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale

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  • Olivier Armantier
  • Jean-Pierre Florens
  • Jean-François Richard

Abstract

[eng] Approximate Equilibrium and an Intuitive Rule: An Application to Bid Tenders in the Space Industry by Olivier Armantier, Jean- Pierre Florens and Jean-François Richard . In this article, we adopt the notion of approximate equilibrium obtained from an "intuitive rule." The notion is based on the idea that, instead of complex Nash equilibrium strategies, agents use simple decision-making rules based on intuition and common sense. We apply this concept to data on the space industry and we come up with two main findings: (1) the equilibrium obtained with our "intuitive rule" provides a good approximation of the Nash equilibrium; (2) an "intuitive rule" enables us to approximate the Nash equilibrium with an unknown structural form in a complex game. [fre] Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale par Olivier Armantier, Jean-Pierre Florens et Jean-François Richard . Nous adoptons dans cet article la notion d'équilibre approximatif obtenu à partir d'une "règle intuitive". Cette notion repose sur l'idée qu'à la place des stratégies complexes à l'équilibre de Nash, les agents utilisent des règles de décision simples et fondées sur l'intuition et le bon sens. Nous appliquons ce concept à des données sur l'industrie spatiale et nous trouvons deux résultats principaux : (1) l'équilibre obtenu avec notre "règle intuitive" est une bonne approximation de l'équilibre de Nash ; (2) dans un jeu complexe une "règle intuitive" nous permet d'approximer un équilibre de Nash dont nous ne connaissons pas la forme structurelle.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-François Richard, 1998. "Équilibre approximatif et règle intuitive : une application aux appels d'offres dans l'industrie spatiale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 179-190.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1998_num_132_1_5907
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1998.5907
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Bargaining rules of thumb," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 15-24, September.
    2. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1993. "Rules of thumb in games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-13, September.
    3. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    4. Levin, Dan & Kagel, John H & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1996. "Revenue Effects and Information Processing in English Common Value Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 442-460, June.
    5. Wilson, Robert, 1992. "Strategic analysis of auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 227-279 Elsevier.
    6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-980, July.
    8. Florens, Jean-Pierre & Hugo, Marie-Anne & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997. "Game theory econometric models: application to procurements in the space industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 951-959, April.
    9. Guerre, E. & Perrigne, I. & Vuong, Q., 1995. "Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions," Papers 9504, Southern California - Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Erwann SbaÏ & Olivier Armantier, 2006. "Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(6), pages 745-779.
    2. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008. "Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • L93 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Air Transportation

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