original papers : Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?
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- Elskamp, Rebecca, 2015. "Empirical Documentation of Bid Shading in the Discriminatory Auction," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205093, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016.
"Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution,"
2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
- Ranaldo, Angelo & Rossi, Enzo, 2016. "Uniform-price Auctions for Swiss Government Bonds: Origin and Evolution," Working Papers on Finance 1609, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance.
- Monostori, Zoltán, 2013.
"Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók [Discriminatory and uniform-price auctions],"
Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1048-1074.
- Monostori, Zoltan, 2013. "Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók [Discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions]," MPRA Paper 54254, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Apr 2013.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Börgers, T., 2003.
"Auction Theory for Auction Design,"
Other publications TiSEM
b04d61c2-a33b-4df4-b39b-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Börgers, T., 2004. "Auction theory for auction design," Other publications TiSEM 23f13b07-cb02-46f9-b072-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- van Damme, E.E.C. & Börgers, T., 2003. "Auction Theory for Auction Design," Discussion Paper 2003-002, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009.
"The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
- Sander Onderstal & Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Rupert Sausgruber, 2004. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 2004.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Florian Englmaier & Pablo Guillen & Loreto Llorente & Sander Onderstal & Rupert Sausgruber, 2006. "The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1782, CESifo.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2007.
"Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions,"
The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 83(s1), pages 57-72, September.
- Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2007. "Designing multi-unit multiple bid auctions: an agent-based computational model of uniform, discriminatory and generalised Vickrey Auctions [Le format des enchères multi-unitaires : un modèle de sim," Post-Print hal-02664994, HAL.
- Juan Aparicio & Juan Ferrando & Ana Meca & Julia Sancho, 2008. "Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 229-241, February.
- Weidlich Anke & Veit Daniel, 2008. "Agent-Based Simulations for Electricity Market Regulation Advice: Procedures and an Example," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 228(2-3), pages 149-172, April.
- Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
More about this item
KeywordsAuctions; government bond markets; uniform-price auctions; discriminatory-price auctions;
All these keywords.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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