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original papers : Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?

Author

Listed:
  • Ken Binmore

    (Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK)

  • Joe Swierzbinski

    (Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK)

Abstract

There has been much discussion of the relative merits of selling government bonds using a uniform-price auction rather than the traditional discriminatory-price auction. Arguments in favor of the former have won the day in respect of the newly instituted auctions of index-linked bonds in the USA and UK. This short paper assesses the evidence and concludes that the advantages of uniform-price auctions have been oversold.

Suggested Citation

  • Ken Binmore & Joe Swierzbinski, 2000. "original papers : Treasury auctions: Uniform or discriminatory?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(4), pages 387-410.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:4:p:387-410
    Note: Received: 28 May 1999 / Accepted: 27 September 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Elskamp, Rebecca, 2015. "Empirical Documentation of Bid Shading in the Discriminatory Auction," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205093, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    2. Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016. "Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution," Economic Studies 2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
    3. Monostori, Zoltán, 2013. "Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók [Discriminatory and uniform-price auctions]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1048-1074.
    4. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    5. van Damme, E.E.C. & Börgers, T., 2003. "Auction Theory for Auction Design," Other publications TiSEM b04d61c2-a33b-4df4-b39b-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Englmaier, Florian & Guillén, Pablo & Llorente, Loreto & Onderstal, Sander & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2009. "The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 286-291, March.
    7. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    8. Atakelty Hailu & Sophie Thoyer, 2007. "Designing Multi‐unit Multiple Bid Auctions: An Agent‐based Computational Model of Uniform, Discriminatory and Generalised Vickrey Auctions," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 83(s1), pages 57-72, September.
    9. Juan Aparicio & Juan Ferrando & Ana Meca & Julia Sancho, 2008. "Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 229-241, February.
    10. Weidlich Anke & Veit Daniel, 2008. "Agent-Based Simulations for Electricity Market Regulation Advice: Procedures and an Example," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 228(2-3), pages 149-172, April.
    11. Eduardo Anthony G. Marino III & Daniel Marszalec, 2020. "Auction Performance, Strategic Supply Management, and Bidder Behavior in Treasury Bill Auctions: Evidence from the Philippines," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1138, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; government bond markets; uniform-price auctions; discriminatory-price auctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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