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Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions

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  • Goldreich, David

Abstract

This paper compares the newer uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing. Empirically, I find that even for the newer uniform-price auctions, the average price received by the Treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism. From the summary statistics released by the Treasury, I calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction. I find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model's predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldreich, David, 2007. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(02), pages 443-466, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:42:y:2007:i:02:p:443-466_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Simulations of Treasury Auctions," Department Discussion Papers 0709, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    2. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
    3. Beetsma, Roel & Giuliodori, Massimo & de Jong, Frank & Widijanto, Daniel, 2016. "Price effects of sovereign debt auctions in the euro-zone: The role of the crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 30-53.
    4. Ismailescu, Iuliana & Phillips, Blake, 2015. "Credit default swaps and the market for sovereign debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 43-61.
    5. Bahamin, Payam & Cebula, Richard & Foley, Maggie & Houmes, Robert, 2011. "The Demand for Treasury Securities at Auction," MPRA Paper 52026, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Tchuindjo, Leonard, 2015. "Pre-auction short positions and impacts on primary dealers’ bidding behavior in US Treasury auctions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 193-201.
    7. Damianov, Damian S. & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2010. "Auctions with variable supply: Uniform price versus discriminatory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 571-593, May.
    8. Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2016. "Pre-auction inventory and bidding behavior: Evidence from Canadian Treasury auctions," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 78-102.
    9. Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2014. "Pre-Auction Inventory and Bidding Behavior—An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Gianluca Cafiso, 2016. "Non-residents’ Holdings, Market Volatility and Public Debt Sustainability. An Analysis with Data for Italy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 484-513, August.
    11. Beetsma, Roel & Giuliodori, Massimo & Hanson, Jesper & de Jong, Frank, 2018. "Bid-to-cover and yield changes around public debt auctions in the euro area," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 118-134.
    12. Angelo Ranaldo & Enzo Rossi, 2016. "Uniform-price auctions for Swiss government bonds: Origin and evolution," Economic Studies 2016-10, Swiss National Bank.
    13. Xue Wang, 2012. "Comparison of two parameterizations of the winner's curse model in a sample of Swedish Treasury auctions," International Journal of Accounting and Information Management, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 20(2), pages 100-113, May.
    14. Dong Lou & Hongjun Yan & Jinfan Zhang, 2013. "Anticipated and Repeated Shocks in Liquid Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(8), pages 1891-1912.
    15. repec:eee:jfinec:v:128:y:2018:i:1:p:103-124 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Jagannathan, Ravi & Jirnyi, Andrei & Sherman, Ann Guenther, 2015. "Share auctions of initial public offerings: Global evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 283-311.
    17. Song, Zhaogang & Zhu, Haoxiang, 2014. "QE Auctions of Treasury Bonds," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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