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Why auction the spectrum?

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  • McMillan, John

Abstract

Of the alternative spectrum allocation methods -- administrative process, lottery, first come first served, and auction -- economic theory, as well as various countries' experiences, show that auctioning works best. As well as raising revenue, an auction assigns licenses to the firms best able to use them. Also the auction can be designed to advance public policy goals such as avoiding monopoly and directing licenses to minority-owned firms.

Suggested Citation

  • McMillan, John, 1995. "Why auction the spectrum?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 191-199, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:19:y:1995:i:3:p:191-199
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    Cited by:

    1. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    2. Erik Bohlin & Gary Madden & Aaron Morey, 2010. "An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations," RSCAS Working Papers 2010/55, European University Institute.
    3. van Damme, E.E.C., 1999. "The Dutch DCS-1800 auction," Other publications TiSEM 91daa0d5-2984-4ad9-afce-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M., 2000. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Affect Consumers Prices? An Experimental Study," Discussion Paper 2000-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Nicolas Gruyer & Nathalie Lenoir, 2003. "Auctioning airport slots (?)," Post-Print hal-01021718, HAL.
    6. Michelle Connolly & Nelson Sa & Azeem Zaman & Chris Roark & Akshaya Trivedi, 2018. "The Evolution of U.S. Spectrum Values Over Time," Working Papers 121, Brandeis University, Department of Economics and International Businesss School.
    7. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
    8. van Damme, E.E.C., 1998. "The auction of DCS-1800 licences," Other publications TiSEM b842dbd8-b285-4314-8506-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2002. "Auctions combined with ex post taxation--expected revenue when three parties want a piece of the cake," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 49-59.
    10. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003. "Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, July.
    11. Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
    12. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters, 2006. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 769-791.
    13. Amlendu Kumar Dubey, 2010. "Initial Allocation of Emissions Permits in the Two-Sided Matching Framework," Journal of Quantitative Economics, The Indian Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), pages 95-104, January.
    14. Peter Cramton, 2002. "Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 01hte, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 16 Jul 2001.
    15. Czygan, Marco, 1997. "Wettbewerb bei der Distribution des Fernsehens und Auswirkungen der Digitalisierung," Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers 13, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics.
    16. Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob & Mayer, Stefan & Shabalin, Pasha, 2014. "Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(7), pages 613-622.
    17. Madden, Gary & Mayer, Walter & Wu, Chen & Tran, Thien, 2015. "The forecasting accuracy of models of post-award network deployment: An application of maximum score tests," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 1153-1158.
    18. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2000. "Designing auctions for offshore petroleum lease allocation," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-16, March.
    19. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," CESifo Working Paper Series 4045, CESifo Group Munich.

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