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Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

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  • Einy, Ezra
  • Haimanko, Ori
  • Orzach, Ram
  • Sela, Aner

Abstract

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We showthat the entire class is dominance solvable, and that there is a natural single-valued selection from the resulting set of sophisticated equilibria. Additionally, it is shown that bidder's information advantage over others is rewarded in sophisticated equilibria.
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  • Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori & Orzach, Ram & Sela, Aner, 2002. "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 247-258, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:37:y:2002:i:3:p:247-258
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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
    2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
    3. Robert B. Wilson, 2021. "Strategic Analysis of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(2), pages 555-561, March.
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    7. Ronald M. Harstad & Dan Levin, 1985. "A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 525-528.
    8. Ori Haimanko & Aner Sela & Ram Orzach & Ezra Einy, 2002. "Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 405-419.
    9. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    10. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    11. EINY, Ezra & HAIMANKO, Ori & ORZACH, Ram & SELA, Aner, 2000. "Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    12. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ezra Einy & Mridu Prabal Goswami & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2017. "Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 79-102, March.
    2. Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan, 2011. "Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 301-309.
    3. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
    4. A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019. "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 303-323, May.
    5. Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
    6. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
    7. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2014. "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps," Working Papers 1402, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    8. Azrieli Yaron & Levin Dan, 2012. "Dominance Solvability of Large k-Price Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-11, May.
    9. Aner Sela & Ezra Einy & 0ri Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Avishay Aiche & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2016. "Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests," Working Papers 1614, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    10. McClellan, Andrew, 2023. "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 173-180.
    11. David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
    12. Abraham, Ittai & Athey, Susan & Babaioff, Moshe & Grubb, Michael D., 2020. "Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 454-477.
    13. José A. Rodrigues‐Neto, 2015. "Monotonic Knowledge Models, Cycles, Linear Versions and Auctions with Differential, Finite Information," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 91(S1), pages 25-37, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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