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The Gender Difference in the Value of Winning

Author

Listed:
  • Zhuoqiong Chen

    (London School of Economics, Department of Management)

  • David Ong

    (Peking University, HSBC Business School, Shenzhen)

  • Roman Sheremeta

    (Case Western Reserve University, Weatherhead School of Management and Economic Science Institute, Chapman University)

Abstract

We design an all-pay auction experiment in which we reveal the gender of the opponent. Using this design, we find that women bid higher than men, but only when bidding against other women. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incorporating differences in risk attitude and the value of winning, suggest that women have a higher value of winning than men.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhuoqiong Chen & David Ong & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "The Gender Difference in the Value of Winning," Working Papers 15-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Jiang, Lingqing, 2020. "Splash with a teammate: Peer effects in high-stakes tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 165-188.
    2. Holt, Charles A. & Porzio, Megan & Song, Michelle Yingze, 2017. "Price bubbles, gender, and expectations in experimental asset markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 72-94.
    3. Jung, SeEun & Vranceanu, Radu, 2019. "Competitive compensation and subjective well-being: The effect of culture and gender," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 90-108.
    4. Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie) & Ong, David & Segev, Ella, 2017. "Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 23-37.
    5. Popescu, Andreea Victoria, 2020. "Essays in asset pricing and auctions," Other publications TiSEM 879f7643-7123-4bc8-a5e7-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Breaban, Adriana & Noussair, Charles N. & Popescu, Andreea Victoria, 2020. "Contests with money and time: Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 391-405.
    7. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman & Szech, Nora, 2016. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Study of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," MPRA Paper 71202, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Gelder, Alan & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Ties," MPRA Paper 67517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Sheremeta, Roman & Szech, Nora, 2020. "Designing Contests Between Heterogeneous Contestants: An Experimental Studie of Tie-Breaks and Bid-Caps in All-Pay Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224585, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Norma Burow & Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger & Melanie Schröder, 2017. "Why Do Women Favor Same-Gender Competition? Evidence from a Choice Experiment," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1662, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    11. Shakun D. Mago & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2017. "Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 407-425, October.
    12. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2016. "The pros and cons of workplace tournaments," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 302-302, October.
    13. Jianxin Wang & Daniel Houser & Hui Xu, 2017. "Do Females Always Generate Small Bubbles? Experimental Evidence from U.S. and China," Working Papers 1063, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Sep 2017.
    14. Chen, Zhuoqiong & Ong, David & Sheremeta, Roman, 2015. "Competition Between and Within Universities: Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Group Identity and the Desire to Win," MPRA Paper 67522, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Oliver Kirchkamp & Wladislaw Mill, 2019. "Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding," CESifo Working Paper Series 7631, CESifo.
    16. Maria Strydom & Amale Scally & John Watson, 2019. "Impact of mood and gender on individual investors’ reactions to retractions and corrections of earnings forecasts," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(9), pages 941-955, February.
    17. Wang, Jianxin & Houser, Daniel & Xu, Hui, 2018. "Culture, gender and asset prices: Experimental evidence from the U.S. and China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 253-287.
    18. Philip J. Grossman & Youngseok Park & Jean Paul Rabanal & Olga A. Rud, 2019. "Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game," Working Papers 141, Peruvian Economic Association.
    19. Bühren, Christoph & Steinberg, Philip J., 2019. "The impact of psychological traits on performance in sequential tournaments: Evidence from a tennis field experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 12-29.
    20. Hubert J. Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2020. "Who withdraws first? Line formation during bank runs," ThE Papers 20/02, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    21. Christian Seel, 2018. "Contests with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 119-133, March.
    22. Mago, Shakun D. & Razzolini, Laura, 2019. "Best-of-five contest: An experiment on gender differences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 164-187.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    experiments; all-pay auction; competitiveness; gender differences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination

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