Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2023. "Optimal contest design: Tuning the heat," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2022. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020.
"Delegating performance evaluation,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Delegating performance evaluation," ECON - Working Papers 266, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2018.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2001.
"The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 542-558, June.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-75, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Moldovanu, Benny & Sela, Aner, 1999. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests," Papers 99-75, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Margaret A. Meyer, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41.
- Paul Schweinzer & Ella Segev, 2012.
"The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 69-82, October.
- Schweinzer, Paul & Segev, Ella, 2008. "The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 250, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2020.
"Designing Dynamic Research Contests,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 270-289, November.
- Jean-Michel Benkert & Igor Letina, 2016. "Designing dynamic research contests," ECON - Working Papers 235, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Aug 2019.
- Aner Sela, 2020. "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 749-771, September.
- Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018.
"Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
- Jörg Franke & Wolfgang Leininger & Cédric Wasser, 2016. "Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6274, CESifo.
- Ron Siegel, 2009.
"All-Pay Contests,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, January.
- Ron Siegel, 2006. "All-Pay Contests," Discussion Papers 06-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Stergios Skaperdas, 1996.
"Contest success functions (*),"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290.
- Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 283-290, February.
- Jorge Lemus & Guillermo Marshall, 2021. "Dynamic Tournament Design: Evidence from Prediction Contests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(2), pages 383-420.
- Jia, Hao & Skaperdas, Stergios & Vaidya, Samarth, 2013.
"Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 211-222.
- Hao Jia & Stergios Skaperdas & Samarth Vaidya, 2012. "Contest Functions: Theoretical Foundations and Issues in Estimation," Working Papers 111214, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- Taylor, Curtis R, 1995. "Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 872-890, September.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2012.
"Carrots And Sticks: Prizes And Punishments In Contests,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 453-462, April.
- Benny Modovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Working Papers 0802, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- moldovanu, benny & Sela, Aner & Shi, Xianwen, 2008. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 6770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Xianwen Shi, 2010. "Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests," Working Papers tecipa-399, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2005.
"Asymmetric contests with general technologies,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(4), pages 923-946, November.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Ewerhart, Christian, 2017.
"Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 167-170.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2017. "Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: the case of two players," ECON - Working Papers 243, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Feng, Xin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2018. "How to split the pie: Optimal rewards in dynamic multi-battle competitions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 82-95.
- Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu, 2015. "Contests with endogenous entry," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 387-424, May.
- Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov, 2019. "Diversification and Information in Contests," Working Paper Series 2019/12, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
- Dawei Fang & Thomas Noe & Philipp Strack, 2020. "Turning Up the Heat: The Discouraging Effect of Competition in Contests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(5), pages 1940-1975.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Ruqu & Zhang, Jun, 2018. "Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 291-317.
- Dixit, Avinash K, 1987. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 891-898, December.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603, Decembrie.
- Xiao, Jun, 2016. "Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 178-221.
- Dana Sisak, 2009. "Multiple‐Prize Contests – The Optimal Allocation Of Prizes," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 82-114, February.
- Jun Xiao, 2012. "Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Heterogeneous," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1151, The University of Melbourne.
- Liu, Bin & Lu, Jingfeng, 2019. "The optimal allocation of prizes in contests with costly entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 137-161.
- Aner Sela & Maya Amiad, 2016.
"The Optimal Allocation Of Punishments In Tullock Contests,"
Working Papers
1613, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Sela, Aner, 2016. "The Optimal Allocation of Punishments in Tullock Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 11592, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sahm, Marco, 2022. "Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players," BERG Working Paper Series 175, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
- Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
- Marco Sahm, 2022. "Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 9601, CESifo.
- Marco Sahm, 2022. "Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-6, March.
- Wang Zhewei, 2010. "The Optimal Accuracy Level in Asymmetric Contests," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-18, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2022. "On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
- Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2024.
"Player Strength and Effort in Contests,"
ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series
285, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2024. "Player strength and effort in contests," Working Papers in Economics and Statistics 4/2024, Linnaeus University, School of Business and Economics, Department of Economics and Statistics.
- Enzo Brox & Daniel Goller, 2024. "Tournaments, Contestant Heterogeneity and Performance," Papers 2401.05210, arXiv.org.
- Sumit Goel, 2022. "Optimal grading contests," Papers 2205.05207, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
- Huang, Ying & Jiao, Qian & Shen, Bo & Sun, Xiang, 2023. "Conflicts in regular networks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ewerhart, Christian, 2017.
"Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
- Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," ECON - Working Papers 186, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2017.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve‐González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2023.
"Heterogeneity, leveling the playing field, and affirmative action in contests,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(3), pages 924-974, January.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-González & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Economics Series Working Papers 915, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018.
"On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests,"
Working Papers
id:12840, eSocialSciences.
- Sakshi Gupta & Ram Singh, 2018. "On Existence and Properties of Pure-strategy Equilibria under Contests," Working papers 288, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020.
"How noise affects effort in tournaments,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," Working Papers w0256, New Economic School (NES).
- Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020.
"Delegating performance evaluation,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
- Igor Letina & Shuo Liu & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Delegating performance evaluation," ECON - Working Papers 266, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2018.
- Morgan, John & Tumlinson, Justin & Várdy, Felix, 2022.
"The limits of meritocracy,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Mr. John Morgan & Justin Tumlinson & Mr. Felix J Vardy, 2018. "The Limits of Meritocracy," IMF Working Papers 2018/231, International Monetary Fund.
- Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2022.
"Simple equilibria in general contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 264-280.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2019. "A general framework for studying contests," MPRA Paper 97363, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 005, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
- Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Spencer Bastani & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2019. "A General Framework for Studying Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 7993, CESifo.
- Alberto Vesperoni, 2016.
"A contest success function for rankings,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
- Vesperoni, Alberto, 2013. "A contest success function for rankings," NEPS Working Papers 8/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
- Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015.
"Advances in Auctions,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,,
Elsevier.
- Kaplan, Todd R & Zamir, Shmuel, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," MPRA Paper 54656, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014.
"Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
- Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2011. "The efficient provision of public goods through non-distortionary tax contests," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 352, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries," CESifo Working Paper Series 4228, CESifo.
- Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020.
"Tournament rewards and heavy tails,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017. "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Working Papers wp2017_05_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University, revised Sep 2018.
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018. "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers w0250, New Economic School (NES).
- Loukas Balafoutas & E. Glenn Dutcher & Florian Lindner & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017.
"The Optimal Allocation Of Prizes In Tournaments Of Heterogeneous Agents,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 461-478, January.
- Loukas Balafoutas & Glenn Dutcher & Florian Lindner & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2012. "The optimal allocation of prizes in tournaments of heterogeneous agents," Working Papers 2012-08, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Markus LANG & Alexander RATHKE & Marco RUNKEL, 2010.
"The Economic Consequences Of Foreigner Rules In National Sports Leagues,"
Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 31, pages 47-64.
- Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke & Marco Runkel, 2009. "The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues," Working Papers 0028, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA), revised Jul 2009.
- Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke & Marco Runkel, 2009. "The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues," Working Papers 0103, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jul 2009.
- Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke & Marco Runkel, 2009. "The Economic Consequences of Foreigner Rules in National Sports Leagues," Working Papers 0908, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
- Goel, Sumit & Goyal, Amit, 2023.
"Optimal tie-breaking rules,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
- Sumit Goel & Amit Goyal, 2023. "Optimal tie-breaking rules," Papers 2304.13866, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2017.
"The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States,"
NBER Working Papers
23657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robinson, James A. & Acemoglu, Daron, 2018. "The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States," CEPR Discussion Papers 13031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Barbieri, Stefano & Serena, Marco, 2022. "Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 1-30.
- Aner Sela & Maya Amiad, 2016.
"The Optimal Allocation Of Punishments In Tullock Contests,"
Working Papers
1613, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Sela, Aner, 2016. "The Optimal Allocation of Punishments in Tullock Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 11592, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015.
"A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2012. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," Working Papers 12-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments," MPRA Paper 59714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Fu, Qiang & Wu, Zenan & Zhu, Yuxuan, 2023. "On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 180-199.
More about this item
Keywords
contest design; optimal contests; tournaments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2020-07-20 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2020-07-20 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Franz Koelliker (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vwibech.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.