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Ron Siegel

Personal Details

First Name:Ron
Middle Name:
Last Name:Siegel
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psi784
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/ronsiegel/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Pennsylvania State University

State College, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://econ.la.psu.edu/
RePEc:edi:depsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ron Siegel & Bruno Strulovici, 2015. "On the Design of Criminal Trials: The Benefits of a Three-Verdict System," Discussion Papers 1581, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Ron Siegel, 2006. "All-Pay Contests," Discussion Papers 06-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Articles

  1. Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2016. "Large Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 835-854, March.
  2. Yuval Salant & Ron Siegel, 2016. "Reallocation Costs and Efficiency," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 203-227, February.
  3. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
  4. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.
  5. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Nonmonotonic Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 59-105, August.
  6. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
  7. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Siegel, Ron, 2013. "Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
  8. Siegel, Ron, 2012. "Participation in deterministic contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 588-592.
  9. Ron Siegel, 2010. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2230-2260, December.
  10. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ron Siegel & Bruno Strulovici, 2015. "On the Design of Criminal Trials: The Benefits of a Three-Verdict System," Discussion Papers 1581, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Lundberg, Alexander, 2016. "Sentencing discretion and burdens of proof," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 34-42.

  2. Ron Siegel, 2006. "All-Pay Contests," Discussion Papers 06-023, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Squintani, 2012. "Introduction to the symposium in political economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 513-519, April.
    2. Szech, Nora, 2015. "Tie-breaks and bid-caps in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 138-149.
    3. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2014. "Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 371-382.
    4. Paul Schweinzer & Ella Segev, 2012. "The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 69-82, October.
    5. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon, 2014. "Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements," NBER Working Papers 19873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2017. "The Emergence of Weak, Despotic and Inclusive States," NBER Working Papers 23657, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 2020. "Optimal Contest Design: A General Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 14854, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Ali, S. Nageeb, 2015. "Recognition for sale," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 16-29.
    9. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs," CEPR Discussion Papers 8509, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2018. "Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(609), pages 827-844, March.
    11. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2012. "A Nested Contest: Tullock Meets the All-pay Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 3976, CESifo.
    12. Kräkel, Matthias & Szech, Nora & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2014. "Externalities in recruiting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 123-135.
    13. Drugov, Mikhail & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2020. "How noise affects effort in tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 14457, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Marco Magnani, 2013. "Why do dictators like white elephants? An application of the all-pay auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(3), pages 2260-2269.
    15. Pierre C. Boyer & Kai A. Konrad & Brian Roberson, 2017. "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities," Working Papers 17-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    16. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2011. "The lifeboat problem," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-106, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    17. Ezra Einy & Mridu Prabal Goswami & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2017. "Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 79-102, March.
    18. Roman M. Sheremeta & Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2014. "Strategically Equivalent Contests," Working Papers 14-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    19. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
    20. Béatrice Roussillon & Paul Schweinzer, 2010. "Efficient emissions reduction," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1004, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    21. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg & Iryna Topolyan, 2014. "The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(3), pages 603-640, November.
    22. Letina, Igor & Liu, Shuo & Netzer, Nick, 0. "Delegating performance evaluation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    23. Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2010. "The optimal design of rewards in contests," MPRA Paper 27397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Isa E. Hafalir & Rustamdjan Hakimov & Dorothea Kübler & Morimitsu Kurino, 2016. "College Admissions with Entrance Exams: Centralized versus Decentralized," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2016-003, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    25. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2012. "Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 8949, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2013. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers 13-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    27. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2014. "Sequential all-pay auctions with noisy outputs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 251-261.
    28. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "Extremism drives out moderation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 861-887, April.
    29. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    30. Minoru Kitahara & Ryo Ogawa, 2010. "All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps," ISER Discussion Paper 0781, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Jun 2010.
    31. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests," Working Papers w0278, New Economic School (NES).
    32. Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2019. "The shape of luck and competition in tournaments," Working Papers w0251, New Economic School (NES).
    33. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
    34. Kirkegaard, René, 2013. "Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 98-110.
    35. Berman, Ron & Katona, Zsolt, 2010. "The Role of Search Engine Optimization in Search Rankings," MPRA Paper 20129, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    36. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Equivalence of Contests," Working Papers 10-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    37. Häfner, Samuel, 2015. "A Tug of War Team Contest," Working papers 2015/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    38. Brian Roberson & Dmitriy Kvasov, 2012. "The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(2), pages 397-433, October.
    39. HHironori Otsubo, 2012. "Contests with Incumbency Advantages: An Experiment Investigation of the Effect of Limits on Spending Behavior and Outcome," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-020, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    40. Dan J. Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2015. "The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity," CESifo Working Paper Series 5653, CESifo.
    41. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions," ECON - Working Papers 155, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    42. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    43. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
    44. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts and Noisy Outputs," Working Papers 1106, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    45. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela, 2014. "Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information and Bid Caps," Working Papers 1402, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    46. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2009. "Gradualism in dynamic agenda formation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 42012, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    47. Kawamura, Kohei & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2014. "Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 240-243.
    48. Chiappinelli, Olga, 2014. "An elimination contest with non-sunk bids," MPRA Paper 56140, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    49. Martin Gregor, 2011. "Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature," Working Papers IES 2011/32, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2011.
    50. Montez, João & Schutz, Nicolas, 2018. "All-Pay Oligopolies: Price Competition with Unobservable Inventory Choices," CEPR Discussion Papers 12963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    51. Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng, 2013. "Competitive effect of cross-shareholdings in all-pay auctions with complete information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 267-277.
    52. Siegel, Ron, 2012. "Participation in deterministic contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 588-592.
    53. Johannes Münster, 2009. "Group contest success functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 41(2), pages 345-357, November.
    54. Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-21, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    55. Wagman, Liad & Conitzer, Vincent, 2008. "Choosing Fair Lotteries to Defeat the Competition," MPRA Paper 10375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    56. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu, 2012. "Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 497-517, March.
    57. Giebe, Thomas & Schweinzer, Paul, 2014. "Consuming your way to efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 1-12.
    58. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    59. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    60. Murray, Fiona & Stern, Scott & Campbell, Georgina & MacCormack, Alan, 2012. "Grand Innovation Prizes: A theoretical, normative, and empirical evaluation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(10), pages 1779-1792.
    61. Martin Gregor, 2013. "The Optimal Ballot Structure for Double-Member Districts," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp493, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    62. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    63. Seel, Christian, 2015. "Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 154-157.
    64. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.
    65. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2009. "Caps on political contributions, monetary penalties and politician preferences," Working Papers 200912, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    66. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    67. Seel, Christian & Stracky, Philipp, 2014. "Continuous Time Contests with Private Information," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100527, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    68. Stylianos Despotakis & Isa Hafalir & R Ravi & Amin Sayedi, "undated". "Expertise in Online Markets," GSIA Working Papers 2015-E8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    69. Mendel, Moritz & Pieroth, Ferdinand & Seel, Christian, 2019. "Your Failure is My Opportunity - Eff ects of Elimination in Contests," Research Memorandum 016, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    70. Kirkegaard, René, 2012. "Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 226-248.
    71. Aner Sela & Ella Segev, 2012. "Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions," Working Papers 1211, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    72. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
    73. Foucart, Renaud & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2016. "Bidding for network size," MPRA Paper 72136, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    74. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrew Hillis & Scott Duke Kominers & Michael Luca, 2016. "Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy," NBER Working Papers 22124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    75. Ryvkin, Dmitry & Drugov, Mikhail, 0. "The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    76. Maria Betto & Matthew W. Thomas, 2021. "Asymmetric All-Pay Contests with Spillovers," Papers 2106.08496, arXiv.org.
    77. Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "To fight or to give up? Dynamic contests with a deadline," Working Papers wp2020_07_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    78. Sela, Aner, 2016. "Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards," CEPR Discussion Papers 11113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    79. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    80. Marco Scarsini & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2010. "Lowest Unique Bid Auctions," Papers 1007.4264, arXiv.org.
    81. Toomas Hinnosaar, 2016. "Dynamic common-value contests," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 479, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    82. Lang, Matthias & Seel, Christian & Strack, Philipp, 2014. "Deadlines in stochastic contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 134-142.
    83. Segev, Ella & Sela, Aner, 2011. "Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts," CEPR Discussion Papers 8183, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    84. Parreiras, Sérgio O. & Rubinchik, Anna, 2010. "Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 703-715, March.
    85. Szech, Nora & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2013. "Rebates in a Bertrand game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 124-133.
    86. Xiao, Jun, 2016. "Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 178-221.
    87. Chi, Chang Koo, 2018. "An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    88. Carlos Lever Guzmán, 2010. "Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks," Working Papers 2010-16, Banco de México.
    89. Ella Segev & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 893-923, December.
    90. James Andreoni & Andy Brownback, 2014. "Grading on a Curve, and other Effects of Group Size on All-Pay Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. Wojciech Olszewski & Ron Siegel, 2016. "Large Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 835-854, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Axel Bernergard & Karl Wärneryd, 2017. "Self-Allocation in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 6636, CESifo.
    2. Pierre C. Boyer & Kai A. Konrad & Brian Roberson, 2017. "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities," Working Papers 17-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    3. Nava Kahana & Doron Klunover, 2017. "Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2017-02, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    4. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2020. "War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 998-1013.
    5. Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017. "Large all-pay auctions with IPV bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 629-640.

  2. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.

    Cited by:

    1. Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019. "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2190r2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2020.
    2. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
    3. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
    4. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019. "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 195-208, June.
    5. Sidartha Gordon & Alessandro Riboni, 2015. "Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 1790-1817, December.
    6. Qiang Fu & Jingfeng Lu & Yue Pan, 2015. "Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2120-2140, July.
    7. Tracy Xiao Liu, 2018. "All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 247-271, March.
    8. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
    9. Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019. "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2190r, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2019.
    10. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
    11. Eliaz, Kfir & Wu, Qinggong, 2018. "A simple model of competition between teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 372-392.
    12. Matros, Alexander & Possajennikov, Alex, 2016. "Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 74-77.
    13. Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
    14. Marco Serena, 2017. "Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2018-11, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    15. Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019. "On The Existence of Equilibrium In Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-669, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    16. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    17. Idione Meneghel & Rabee Tourky, 2019. "On the Existence of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games Without Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2190, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    18. Timothy Mathews & Shane Sanders, 2019. "Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 169-174, June.
    19. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019. "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 99-130.

  3. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph & Rogers, Brian W., 2016. "Efficiency based measures of inequality," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 512, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    3. Damian S. Damianov & Shane Sanders & Anil Yildizparlak, 2018. "Asymmetric endogenous prize contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 435-453, October.
    4. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

  4. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Asymmetric Contests with Head Starts and Nonmonotonic Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 59-105, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Dahm, Matthias & Esteve-González, Patricia, 2018. "Affirmative action through extra prizes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 123-142.
    2. Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019. "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 419-433.
    3. Sérgio O. Parreiras & Anna Rubinchik, 2020. "Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 765-783, October.
    4. Derek J. Clark & Tore Nilssen, 2021. "Competitive balance when winning breeds winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 363-384, February.
    5. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
    6. David Perez Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2014. "Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers 1407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    7. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2018. "Optimal favoritism in all-pay auctions and lottery contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 22-37.
    8. Christian Seel, 2018. "Contests with endogenous deadlines," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 119-133, March.
    9. David Pérez‐Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2016. "Discrimination In A Model Of Contests With Incomplete Information About Ability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 881-914, August.
    10. Häfner, Samuel, 2015. "A Tug of War Team Contest," Working papers 2015/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    11. Matthew T. Cole & James Lake & Benjamin Zissimos, 2018. "Contesting an International Trade Agreement," CESifo Working Paper Series 6956, CESifo.
    12. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Beating the Matthew Effect: Head Starts and Catching Up in a Dynamic All-Pay Auction," Memorandum 2/2018, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    13. Seel, Christian & Wasser, Cédric, 2014. "On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 211-214.
    14. Franke, Jörg & Leininger, Wolfgang & Wasser, Cédric, 2014. "Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests," Ruhr Economic Papers 524, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    15. Huang, Lingbo & Murad, Zahra, 2021. "Fighting alone versus fighting for a team: An experiment on multiple pairwise contests," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 616-631.
    16. Clark, Derek J. & Nilssen, Tore, 2018. "Keep on fighting: The dynamics of head starts in all-pay auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 258-272.
    17. David K. Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2020. "Voter Turnout with Peer Punishment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3298-3314, October.
    18. Seel, Christian, 2015. "Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 154-157.
    19. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
    20. Dahm, Matthias, 2018. "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 256-282.
    21. David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi, 2021. "Success in Contests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001563, David K. Levine.
    22. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    23. Zhu, Feng, 2021. "On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

  5. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "All-pay contests with performance spillovers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 35-39.
    2. Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020. "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers 2010, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Boosey Luke A., 2016. "Competition in a Posted-Salary Matching Market under Private Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 599-631, June.
    4. Xiao, Jun, 2016. "Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 178-221.

  6. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Siegel, Ron, 2013. "Adverse selection and unraveling in common-value labor markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.

    Cited by:

    1. Adina D. Sterling, 2014. "Friendships and Search Behavior in Labor Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(9), pages 2341-2354, September.
    2. Josephson, Jens & Shapiro, Joel, 2016. "Costly interviews," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 10-15.

  7. Ron Siegel, 2010. "Asymmetric Contests with Conditional Investments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2230-2260, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Sérgio O. Parreiras & Anna Rubinchik, 2020. "Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 765-783, October.
    2. Kräkel, Matthias & Szech, Nora & von Bieberstein, Frauke, 2014. "Externalities in recruiting," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 123-135.
    3. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "All-pay contests with performance spillovers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 35-39.
    4. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
    5. David Perez Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2014. "Discrimination in a new model of contests with two-sided asymmetric information," Working Papers 1407, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    6. Bastani, Spencer & Giebe, Thomas & Gürtler, Oliver, 2020. "A general framework for studying contests," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224601, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Zhiguo He & Gregor Matvos, 2016. "Debt and Creative Destruction: Why Could Subsidizing Corporate Debt Be Optimal?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(2), pages 303-325, February.
    8. Kaplan, Todd R & Wettstein, David, 2010. "The optimal design of rewards in contests," MPRA Paper 27397, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2013. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information and Identity-Dependent Externalities," Working Papers 13-10, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    10. Bettina Klose & Dan Kovenock, 2015. "Extremism drives out moderation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(4), pages 861-887, April.
    11. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    12. David Pérez‐Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2016. "Discrimination In A Model Of Contests With Incomplete Information About Ability," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 881-914, August.
    13. Chen Cohen & David Lagziel & Ofer Levi & Aner Sela, 2020. "All-Pay Auctions With Heterogeneous Prizes And Partially Asymmetric Players," Working Papers 2010, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    14. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
    15. Franke, Jörg & Kanzow, Christian & Leininger, Wolfgang & Schwartz, Alexandra, 2013. "Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79998, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Blake Allison & Adib Bagh & Jason Lepore, 2018. "Invariant Equilibria and Classes of Equivalent Games," Working Papers 1805, California Polytechnic State University, Department of Economics.
    17. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019. "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 195-208, June.
    18. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "Elastic contests and the robustness of the all-pay auctions," ECON - Working Papers 155, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    19. Hirata, Daisuke, 2014. "A model of a two-stage all-pay auction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 5-13.
    20. Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel, 2013. "Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 835-844, November.
    21. Matthew T. Cole & James Lake & Benjamin Zissimos, 2018. "Contesting an International Trade Agreement," CESifo Working Paper Series 6956, CESifo.
    22. Stefan Jönsson & Armin Schmutzler, 2013. "All-pay auctions: Implementation and optimality," ECON - Working Papers 108, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    23. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2014. "Innovation Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series 4712, CESifo.
    24. Seel, Christian, 2015. "Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 154-157.
    25. Ron Siegel, 2014. "Contests with productive effort," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(3), pages 515-523, August.
    26. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 195-211.
    27. Seel, Christian & Stracky, Philipp, 2014. "Continuous Time Contests with Private Information," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100527, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    28. Olivier Bos & Martin Ranger, 2014. "All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 115-116, pages 361-377.
    29. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Patricia Esteve-Gonzalez & Anwesha Mukherjee, 2020. "Heterogeneity, Leveling the Playing Field, and Affirmative Action in Contests," Munich Papers in Political Economy 06, TUM School of Governance at the Technical University of Munich.
    30. Dahm, Matthias, 2018. "Semi-targeted all-pay auctions: A partial exclusion principle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 256-282.
    31. Minchuk, Yizhaq, 2018. "Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 28-30.
    32. Jürgen Mihm & Jochen Schlapp, 2019. "Sourcing Innovation: On Feedback in Contests," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 559-576, February.
    33. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    34. Szech, Nora & Weinschenk, Philipp, 2013. "Rebates in a Bertrand game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 124-133.
    35. Xiao, Jun, 2016. "Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 178-221.
    36. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019. "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 99-130.

  8. Ron Siegel, 2009. "All-Pay Contests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 71-92, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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