The choice of monetary instruments and the theory of bureaucracy
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References listed on IDEAS
- Harry G. Johnson, 1968. "Problems of Efficiency in Monetary Management," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 971-971.
- James Q. Wilson, 1961. "The Economy of Patronage," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 369-369.
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- Josh Ryan-Collins, 2015. "Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935-75," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_848, Levy Economics Institute.
- Kim, Iljoong & Kim, Inbae, 2007. "Endogenous selection of monetary institutions: With the case of discount windows and bureaucratic discretion," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 330-350, September.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
- Jim Granato & William West, 1994. "Words And Deeds: Symbolic Politics And Decision Making At The Federal Reserve," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 233-255, November.
- James Forder, 2005. "The limits of `independence' and the policy of the ECB^," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 431-444, December.
- Arahata, Katsumi, 2005. "Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19422, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- James Forder, 2002. "Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the theory of bureaucracy," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-69.
- Robert D. Auerbach, 1991. "Institutional Preservation At The Federal Reserve," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 9(3), pages 46-58, July.
- Victor Goldberg, 1982. "Peltzman on regulation and politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 291-297, January.
- Arahata, Katsumi, 2006. "Who Are More Sensitive to Food-Borne Risks in Japan, Consumers or Politicians?: A Political Economy Perspective," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21256, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Eugenia Toma & Mark Toma, 1985. "Research activities and budget allocations among Federal Reserve Banks," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 175-191, January.
- Voutsinas, Konstantinos & Werner, Richard A., 2011. "New evidence on the effectiveness of "Quantitative Easing" in Japan," CFS Working Paper Series 2011/30, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093.
- Jon Faust, 1992. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," International Finance Discussion Papers 429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 1992.
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