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Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment

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  • Andreas Haufler
  • Ian Wooton

Abstract

The paper analyzes the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalizing all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, 2001. "Regional Tax Coordination and Foreign Direct Investment," Working Papers 2001_11, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2001_11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Facundo Albornoz, Gregory Corcos and Toby Kendall, 2005. "Subsidy Competition and the Mode of FDI: Acquisition vs Greenfield," Discussion Papers 05-15, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    2. Leon Bettendorf & Albert Van Der Horst & Ruud A. De Mooij & Hendrik Vrijburg, 2010. "Corporate Tax Consolidation and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 453-479, December.
    3. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 2006. "The effects of regional tax and subsidy coordination on foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-305, February.
    4. Brulhart, Marius & Jametti, Mario, 2006. "Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2027-2062, November.
    5. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber & Jack Mintz, 2003. "Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey," CESifo Working Paper Series 956, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Giuseppe Francesco Gori & Luca Lambertini & Alessandro Tampieri, 2014. "Trade costs, FDI incentives, and the intensity of price competition," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 10(4), pages 371-385, December.
    7. Facundo Albornoz and Gregory Corcos, 2005. "Subsidy Competition in Integrating Economies," Discussion Papers 05-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
    8. Valpy Fitzgerald, 2002. "International Tax Co-operation and Capital Mobility," Oxford Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 251-266.
    9. Osiris J. Parcero, 2009. "Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies," Working Papers 2009/34, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Facundo Albornoz & Grégory Corcos, 2005. "Subsidy competition in integrating economies," Working Papers halshs-00590785, HAL.
    11. Joy Bhadury & H. Eiselt, 2012. "Optimizing subsidies for the location of distribution centers," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-261, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax competition; regional coordination; international investment;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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