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Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

Author

Listed:
  • Oscar Amerighi
  • Giuseppe Feo

Abstract

In this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market. We investigate how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition between the two governments seeking to attract FDI. We show that the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare-maximizing firm, while its welfare may decrease when it is a private firm, as already shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). We also show that, contrary to the case of a private domestic incumbent, a public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare-maximizer location. Finally, an efficiency-enhancing role of policy competition may only arise when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, while tax competition is always wasteful when the incumbent is a public firm.
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Suggested Citation

  • Oscar Amerighi & Giuseppe Feo, 2017. "Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 811-826, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:19:y:2017:i:4:p:811-826
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/jpet.2017.19.issue-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Jie Ma & Ian Wooton, 2020. "Market size, product differentiation and bidding for new varieties," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 27(2), pages 257-279, April.
    2. Steven Brakman & Harry Garretsen & Charles van Marrewijk & Arjen van Witteloostuijn, 2023. "The location of cross‐border and national mergers and acquisitions within the United States," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 177-206, January.
    3. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2020. "Endogenous public and private leadership with diverging social and private marginal costs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 88(5), pages 699-730, September.
    4. Hirofumi OKOSHI & Hiroshi MUKUNOKI, 2024. "Keep Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer: Network externality and tax competition," Discussion papers 24024, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    5. Hirofumi OKOSHI & Kyikyi Thar, 2023. "Backfired Deregulation of Foreign Ownership Restrictions under Fiscal Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," Discussion papers 23059, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Thanh Tam Nguyen‐Huu & Ngoc‐Sang Pham, 2024. "FDI spillovers, new industry development, and economic growth," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 26(1), February.
    7. Keisaku HIGASHIDA & Hirofumi OKOSHI, 2024. "Together or Apart? Eco-friendly location under fiscal competition," Discussion papers 24086, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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