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Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm

  • Oscar Amerighi

    ()

    (Departiment of Economic Sciences, University of Bologna)

  • Giuseppe De Feo

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Pavia)

In this paper we investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market. We investigate how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition between the two governments seeking to attract FDI. We show that the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare-maximizing firm, while its welfare may decrease when it is a private firm, as already shown by Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). We also show that, contrary to the case of a private domestic incumbent, a public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare-maximizer location. Finally, an efficiency-enhancing role of policy competition may only arise when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, while tax competition is always wasteful when the incumbent is a public firm.

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File URL: http://economia.unipv.it/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q161.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods in its series Quaderni di Dipartimento with number 161.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pav:wpaper:161
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  1. Debashis Pal & Mark D. White, 1998. "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 264-281, October.
  2. Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
  3. Barros, Pedro P & Cabral, Luis, 2000. "Competing for Foreign Direct Investment," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 360-71, May.
  4. Haaland, J.I. & Wooton, I., 1998. "International Competition for Multinational Investment," Papers 14/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. Haskel, Jonathan & Wolf, Holger, 2001. " The Law of One Price--A Case Study," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 545-58, December.
  6. Markusen, James R., 2002. "Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade," MPRA Paper 8380, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
  8. Haufler, Andreas & Wooton, Ian, 1997. "Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 1583, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Andreas Haufler & Ian Wooton, . "Country Size and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment," Working Papers 9702, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
  10. Fumagalli, Chiara, 2003. "On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 963-983, December.
  11. Bjorvatn, Kjetil & Eckel, Carsten, 2006. "Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(7), pages 1891-1907, October.
  12. Matthias Lutz, 2004. "Pricing in Segmented Markets, Arbitrage Barriers, and the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 456-475, 08.
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