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On the FDI-attracting property of privatizatio

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  • Amerighi, Oscar
  • De Feo, Giuseppe

Abstract

In this paper, we provide an explanation of why privatization may attract foreign investors willing to enter a regional market. Privatization turns the formerly-public firm into a less aggressive competitor since profit-maximizing output is lower than the welfaremaximizing one. The drawback is that social welfare generally decreases. We also investigate tax/subsidy competition for FDI and put forward its potentially positive role. On the one hand, it may reduce the negative impact on welfare of an FDI-attracting privatization. On the other hand, it may prevent a welfare-reducing investment by the foreign firm. This sheds light on the substitute/complementary relationship between the two policies and the two objectives of governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Amerighi, Oscar & De Feo, Giuseppe, 2010. "On the FDI-attracting property of privatizatio," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-34, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
  • Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:138
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/138
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign Direct Investment; Privatization; Policy Competition;

    JEL classification:

    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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