Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good
This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's law of income redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:93:y:1997:i:3-4:p:221-44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.