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Report NEP-DES-2022-04-18
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bernhard Kasberger, 2022, "An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2202.07517, Feb, revised Mar 2022.
- Bernhard Kasberger & Alexander Teytelboym, 2022, "The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.11783, Mar, revised Oct 2025.
- Bharadwaj Satchidanandan & Munther A. Dahleh, 2022, "Incentive Compatibility in Two-Stage Repeated Stochastic Games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2203.10206, Mar, revised Oct 2022.
- Agustín G. Bonifacio & Elena Inarra & Pablo Neme, 2022, "Stable Decompositions of Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 110, Jan.
- Agustín Bonifacio & Jordi Massó & Pablo Neme, 2022, "Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 121, Mar.