Voting by Committees with Exit
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References listed on IDEAS
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"On Exiting After Voting,"
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"A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model,"
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More about this item
KeywordsStrategy-proofness; voting; stability; and committees;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
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