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Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy

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  • Wolfgang Buchholz

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  • Wolfgang Peters

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Abstract

Applying a willingness to pay approach known from contingent valuation in environmental economics, we develop an ordinally based measure for the size of individual sacrifice that is connected with an agent's contribution to a public good. We construct a selection mechanism that picks the unique efficient solution among all allocations that have an equal sacrifice as defined in this way. We show that the solution thus obtained correspond to Moulin’s egalitarian equivalent allocation, conforms to both the ability to pay and the benefit principles, and has much in common with the Lindahl equilibrium.
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Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2008. "Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 415-429, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:15:y:2008:i:4:p:415-429
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-008-9073-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lasse Ringius & Asbjørn Torvanger & Arild Underdal, 2002. "Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-22, March.
    2. Udo Ebert, 2003. "Environmental Goods and the Distribution of Income," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(4), pages 435-459, August.
    3. Hines Jr., James R., 2000. "What is benefit taxation?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 483-492, March.
    4. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, March.
    5. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2006. "Benefit-Cost in a Benevolent Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 339-351, March.
    6. Moyes, Patrick, 2003. "Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 111-140, January.
    7. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "Justifying the Lindahl solution as an outcome of fair cooperation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 157-169, October.
    8. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521834773, August.
    9. Sandler,Todd, 2004. "Global Collective Action," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521542548, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. L.F.M. Groot & J. Swart, 2015. "From Nash to Lindahl in Climate Change Policy," Working Papers 15-01, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Bruno Martorano, 2014. "The Impact of Uruguay's 2007 Tax Reform on Equity and Efficiency," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 32(6), pages 701-714, November.
    3. Loek Groot & Julia Swart, 2018. "Climate change control: the Lindahl solution," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 23(5), pages 757-782, June.
    4. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2016. "Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 61-78, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods; Cooperative solutions; Fairness; Egalitarian-equivalent solutions; H41;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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