The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis
The implications of equal sacrifice taxation have only been pursued in a very narrow context. This note applies this principle to the problem of levying taxes to provide public goods. Its purpose is to determine how taxes used to finance public goods must be structured in order to benefit each agent equally. This tax structure may be viewed as a benchmark against which to compare tax regimes with redistributive intent.
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Volume (Year): 17 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Note:||Received: 10 April 1997/Accepted: 16 November 1998|
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