A fair solution to the compensation problem
We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with different, non transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them. We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on efficiency, fairness and robustness properties. Taking into account incentive constraints we derive the optimal policy: individuals with the same talent need to be equally compensated and only people whose level of talent is below a certain threshold should receive a positive compensation.
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Volume (Year): 32 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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