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Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills


  • MANIQUET, François


We develop an approach which escapes Arrow’s impossibility by relying on information about agents’ indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005
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  • FLEURBAEY, Marc & MANIQUET, François, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1805, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1805
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0294-y
    Note: In :Social Choice and Welfare, 24, 93-127, 2005.

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