IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Resource Egalitarianism with a Dash of Efficiency

  • SPRUMONT, Yves

We study the problem of defining inequality-averse social orderings over the space of allocations in a multi-commodity environment where individuals differ only in their preferences. We formulate notions of egalitarianism based on the axiom that any dominance between the consumption bundles of two individuals should be reduced. This Dominance Aversion requirement is compatible with Consensus, a weak version of the Pareto principle saying that an allocation y is better than x whenever everybody finds that everyone's bundle at y is better than at x. We identify two families of multidimensional leximin orderings satisfying Dominance Aversion and Consensus. We also discuss weaker forms of egalitarianism based on a new definition of multidimensional Lorenz dominance.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1866/1482
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2007-03.

as
in new window

Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-03
Contact details of provider: Postal:
CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7

Phone: (514) 343-6540
Fax: (514) 343-5831
Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
  2. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1975. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," Discussion Papers 174, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Post-Print hal-00246525, HAL.
  4. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 145-166, 04.
  5. Gilboa, I. & Samet, D. & Schmeidler, D., 2001. "Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes," Papers 2001-17, Tel Aviv.
  6. Thibault Gajdos & John Weymark, 2005. "Multidimensional generalized Gini indices," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 471-496, October.
  7. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Papers 2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  8. A. B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon, 1982. "The Comparison of Multi-Dimensioned Distributions of Economic Status," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 183-201.
  9. Shorrocks, Anthony F, 1983. "Ranking Income Distributions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(197), pages 3-17, February.
  10. François Maniquet, 2007. "Social orderings and the evaluation of public policy," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 37-60.
  11. Tsui Kai-Yuen, 1995. "Multidimensional Generalizations of the Relative and Absolute Inequality Indices: The Atkinson-Kolm-Sen Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 251-265, October.
  12. Hausman, Daniel & McPherson, Michael, 1994. "Preference, Belief, and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 396-400, May.
  13. Serge-Christophe Kolm, 1977. "Multidimensional Egalitarianisms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 91(1), pages 1-13.
  14. M. Fleurbaey & A. Trannoy, 2000. "The Impossibility of a Paretian Egalitarian," THEMA Working Papers 2000-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  15. Gleb Koshevoy, 1997. "The Lorenz zonotope and multivariate majorizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(1), pages 1-14.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2007-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sharon BREWER)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.