Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes
Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society`s utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.
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|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.|
Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/foerder/about
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97-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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- MONGIN, Philippe, 1996. "The Paradox of the Bayesian Experts and State-Dependent Utility Theory," CORE Discussion Papers 1996026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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1993019, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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